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HOME, SCHOOLING, AND STATE: EDUCATION IN,
AND FOR, A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY*
VIVIAN E. HAMILTON **
Since the late nineteenth century, virtually all school-aged children have
attended school; only rarely did children live and learn entirely within their
homes. In recent decades, however, the practice of elective homeschooling has
emerged, and the number of families opting out of regular schools has surged.
Currently, the parents of nearly two million school-aged children annually
eschew traditional schooling.
A small but well-resourced homeschool lobby has aggressively pressured state
legislators to withdraw state oversight of homeschooling. No similarly resourced
lobby exists to counterbalance these efforts. As a result, states now impose few—
and in some cases, no—obligations on parents who choose to homeschool their
children. These parents exercise near-total authority over every aspect of their
children’s lives. Many parents homeschool to inculcate in their children their
own religious beliefs and values and to insulate children from the diverse values,
cultures, and identities they would otherwise encounter in the pluralistic society
outside their homes.
This Article argues that it is past time to consider the principles that ought to
guide state decisionmaking affecting the regulation of homeschooling in the
democratic state. I show that homeschooling implicates the state’s commitments
to safeguard the welfare of its young citizens, to guarantee individuals’
entitlement to determine the course of their own lives, and to cultivate a
citizenry capable of engaging productively in the shared project of democratic
governance with fellow citizens who themselves reflect the diversity that is an
enduring fact of life in the United States.
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I conclude by drawing on the political theory of education and the science of child
and adolescent cognitive development to propose a regulatory compromise that is
both principled and pragmatic.
INTRODUCTION............................................................................ 1349
I.
THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. EDUCATION: FROM HOME TO
SCHOOL . . . AND BACK AGAIN ........................................... 1353
A. Nineteenth Century: Common Schools, Compulsory Education,
and the Assimilationist Project.......................................... 1354
B. Twentieth Century: Standardization, Secularization, Integration,
and the Retreat from Regular Schools................................. 1356
C. Twenty-First Century: The Current Practice of
Homeschooling ................................................................ 1359
1. Motivations for Homeschooling .............................. 1359
2. Academic Attainment ............................................. 1360
3. Children’s Welfare ................................................. 1363
II.
THE LAW OF HOMESCHOOLING........................................ 1364
A. The Constitutionally Derived Parental Right To Direct the
Education of Children, and Its Limits................................ 1365
B. Challenges to States’ Regulation of Homeschooling: State and
Lower Federal Courts ..................................................... 1370
C. Deregulation of Homeschooling ......................................... 1372
III. THE STATE’S INTERESTS IN EDUCATION ............................1375
A. The Liberal State ............................................................1377
1. Respecting Parents’ Liberty Interests....................... 1378
2. Children’s Welfare, Agency, and Eventual Right to SelfDetermination ........................................................ 1380
B. The Democratic State: Cultivating a Citizenry Capable of SelfGovernment .................................................................. 1382
C. The Economic State: Raising a Modern Workforce............... 1383
IV. BRIDGING HOME AND SCHOOL ......................................... 1384
A. Homeschooling and Autonomy .......................................... 1385
B. Homeschooling and Democratic Citizenship ........................ 1386
C. Homeschooling for the Modern Workforce ........................... 1386
D. Existing Proposals........................................................... 1388
E. A Proposal for Both Compromise and Principle .................... 1390
1. Presumptively Permitting Homeschooling in the Primary
Years ..................................................................... 1390
2. Presumption Against Home Secondary-Schooling.... 1391
F. Anticipated Objections..................................................... 1393
CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 1393

98 N.C. L. REV. 1347 (2020)

2020]

HOME, SCHOOLING, AND STATE

1349

INTRODUCTION
Picture to yourself . . . a society which comprises all the nations of the world . . .
people differing from one another in language, in beliefs, in opinions . . . [w]hat
is the connecting link between these so different elements? How are they welded
into one people?
—Alexis de Tocqueville 1
What are the proper goals of education in a multicultural, diverse
democracy? I argue that they include cultivating a citizenry that is selfdetermining, with its members capable of productively participating (should
they so choose) in civil society, democratic governance, and meaningful work. 2
This first question, however, prompts a second: how far should states go
to achieve their education goals, particularly with respect to the children of
parents who actively reject multiculturalism and diversity altogether and choose
to educate their children in relative isolation through homeschooling? Despite
the important implications of this question, scholars have only begun to
examine the burgeoning practice of homeschooling.
Virtually all children in the United States attended “regular” public or
private schools from the late-nineteenth to the late-twentieth centuries. 3
Beginning in the 1980s, however, an increasing number of parents began
withdrawing children from schools altogether and educating them at home, with
varying degrees of exposure to curriculum comprising a modern comprehensive
education. 4 States do little to ensure that homeschooled children receive
minimally adequate instruction; indeed, some three-fourths of the states impose
no curricular oversight. 5

1. Quoted in WERNER SOLLORS, BEYOND ETHNICITY: CONSENT AND DESCENT IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 3 (1986).
2. In a 2010 article, I proposed a framework to guide state decisionmaking affecting the young
across a range of law and policy contexts. See Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and the State, 2010
BYU L. REV. 1055, 1121–22 (2010) [hereinafter Hamilton, Immature Citizens]. In its concluding section,
the article suggested a range of policy changes consistent with the framework. Id. at 1128–47. One of
those policy changes was obligatory out-of-home (or “regular”) secondary education. Id. at 1129–35.
This Article squarely analyzes the context of homeschooling and proposes a more nuanced regulatory
approach. I have similarly expanded in other work on different policymaking contexts that might flow
from the framework developed in Immature Citizens. See, e.g., Vivian E. Hamilton, Liberty Without
Capacity: Why States Should Ban Adolescent Driving, 48 GA. L. REV. 1019 (2014) (driving); Vivian E.
Hamilton, Democratic Inclusion, Cognitive Development, and the Age of Electoral Majority, 77 BROOK. L.
REV. 1447 (2012) (voting); Vivian E. Hamilton, The Age of Marital Capacity: Reconsidering Civil
Recognition of Adolescent Marriage, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1817 (2012) (marriage).
3. In this Article, I use the term “regular” school to encompass a broad range of traditional
organizational structures, including public, quasi-public, charter, and private schools.
4. See infra Section II.A for a discussion of parents’ constitutional right to direct the upbringing
of children and the limits of that right.
5. See infra notes 201–14 and accompanying text.

98 N.C. L. REV. 1347 (2020)

1350

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

This Article extends the scholarship examining the nascent, largely
unregulated practice of homeschooling. It does so by examining how the
practice implicates core commitments of the democratic state. It then, informed
by insights from the science of cognitive development, proposes a regulatory
approach aimed at meeting the goals of parents, the interests of children, and
the obligations of the state to all its citizenry.
The common school movement of the nineteenth century resulted in state
education systems that were both publicly funded and compulsory. 6 It aimed to
ensure that all children had access to education and the economic opportunities
it provided, to inculcate shared cultural and civic values, and to shield children
from the dangers of industrial labor. 7 By the twentieth century, the
overwhelming majority of children attended common, or public, schools.
Homeschooling, by contrast, was nearly unheard of. 8
The institutionalization and standardization of public education by the
mid-twentieth century led some on the left to criticize what they perceived to
be overly regimented, bureaucratic systems that stifled creativity and
individuality and encouraged conformity. 9 On the right, parents recoiled
against legal decisions that required public schools to become both integrated
and secular. 10 Parents began withdrawing their children from public—then
private—schools, initiating what has been a four-decades-long rise in the
practice of homeschooling. 11
Some studies have indicated that the number of children homeschooled in
the United States now approaches two million. 12 Yet while the practice has
grown, state oversight of homeschooling has steadily eroded. When state
legislators attempt to enact legislation requiring standardized testing or
otherwise increasing regulation, homeschool lobbying and political action
organizations aggressively marshal the homeschooling community to
overwhelm individual legislators and defeat regulatory efforts. 13

6. See infra Section I.A.
7. See infra Section I.A.
8. See infra Sections I.A, I.B.
9. See infra Section I.B.
10. See infra Section I.B.
11. See infra Section I.B.
12. See Sarah Grady, A Fresh Look at Homeschooling in the U.S., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT.:
BLOG (Sept. 26, 2017), https://nces.ed.gov/blogs/nces/post/a-fresh-look-at-homeschooling-in-the-u-s
[http://perma.cc/5TZ8-WJTV] (noting that approximately 1.7 million children, or 3.3% of all K-12
students, were homeschooled in the United States in 2016); see also Table 206.10, Number and Percentage
of Homeschooled Students Ages 5 Through 17 with a Grade Equivalent of Kindergarten Through 12th Grade,
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT. (Feb. 2018), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d17/tables
/dt17_206.10.asp [http://perma.cc/2KGS-KWKY].
13. See infra Section II.C.
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The dramatic increase in homeschooling has caused growing consternation
among educators, academics, and some homeschool graduates. Their concerns
are threefold.
First, withdrawing children from school under the pretense of
homeschooling can facilitate abusive parents’ mistreatment of children by
shielding them from the gaze of school personnel and other mandatory reporters
(individuals required by law to report suspected mistreatment). 14 Troublingly,
some research has found connections between child mistreatment and
homeschooling. 15
Second, evidence suggests that many homeschooled children do not
receive minimally adequate educations. 16 Homeschooling advocacy
organizations tout studies to the contrary, but these have overwhelmingly been
conducted by advocacy researchers who are themselves part of the
homeschooling movement. 17 Because these studies often use selective samples
of students, reputable academics have largely discredited them. 18 Additionally,
because some states do not require homeschooled children to participate in
standardized testing, evidence about the numbers of children homeschooled,
and the efficacy of the education they receive, is incomplete and unreliable. The
more reliable evidence demonstrates that a troubling percentage of
homeschooled children fail to receive educations adequate to prepare them to
participate in the modern workforce. 19
Third, an important goal of education in a democracy is to equip children
to become self-determining citizens capable of participating in civic and
political life. Many parents, however, homeschool their children so that they

14. See Carmen Green, Note, Educational Empowerment: A Child’s Right to Attend Public School, 103
GEO. L.J. 1089, 1097–98 (2015) (noting that “a substantial amount of anecdotal evidence show[s] that
some abusive parents, who have no intention of educating their children, have taken advantage of lax
homeschooling laws to hide their children from mandatory reporters in the school system”).
15. See, e.g., COAL. FOR RESPONSIBLE HOME EDUC., AN ISSUE BRIEF: AT-RISK
HOMESCHOOLED CHILDREN 1–3 (May 2017), https://www.responsiblehomeschooling.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/CRHE-At-Risk-Children-Brief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HLF4-V3T6]
(discussing a 2014 study which found that forty-seven percent of school-aged child torture cases
examined involved children who had been enrolled in school and were later removed to be
homeschooled); see also Elizabeth Bartholet, Homeschooling: Parent Rights Absolutism vs. Child Rights to
Education & Protection, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 14–19 (2020) (summarizing studies as well as anecdotal
evidence of child maltreatment among homeschooling families and concluding that although “there is
no way . . . to determine the exact scope of the child maltreatment problem in homeschooling,” the
unregulated nature of homeschooling in many states “poses serious risks of abuse and neglect”).
16. For a discussion and comparison of reliable and unreliable research see Bartholet, supra note
15, at 13 (noting that “[m]any homeschooling parents are simply not capable of educating their children”
and that “[m]any homeschooling graduates complain about educational neglect”).
17. See infra Section I.C.
18. See infra Section I.C.
19. See infra Section I.C.
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will not be exposed to diverse beliefs. Without such exposure, it is parents—not
their children—who determine their children’s life courses.
To be sure, many homeschooling parents provide their children with
quality education and introduce them to diverse ideas and people. Lax (or
nonexistent) state oversight, however, makes it impossible to identify those who
do not.
Educators and state officials have, largely in vain, resisted the erosion of
the state’s role in overseeing education. A small but growing number of legal
scholars have expressed concerns about the rise of homeschooling and
simultaneous withdrawal of state oversight. 20 Some have called for significant
increase in regulation, while others call for outright prohibition of the practice. 21
In this Article, I propose a regulatory approach that permits parents to
homeschool in the primary years but imposes a presumption against
homeschooling in the secondary years, arguing that children’s rights and
society’s interest in educating competent citizens should prevent parents’
religious or moral convictions alone from justifying homeschooling after
adolescence.
Part I describes the evolution of common schooling and the emergence of
homeschooling in the United States that began in earnest only in the 1980s.
Part II describes the constitutional and state laws governing
homeschooling, and how—also since the 1980s—small but well-funded interest
groups have pressed for the deregulation of homeschooling and succeeded in
increasing parents’ ability to choose their preferred educational method.
In Part III, I draw from educational theory to identify the contours of the
state’s interest in, and goals for, education. The state’s role in safeguarding
children’s welfare justifies it giving parents the presumptive authority to raise
and educate their children. Doing so also respects parents’ expressive liberty
interests in childrearing. These liberty interests must be constrained, however,
to safeguard children’s well-being and ultimate right to self-determination. The
state’s role in ensuring an enduring and robust democracy requires it to cultivate
a citizenry that, once mature, will have the ability to participate productively in
civic life and self-governance with diverse fellow citizens. Finally, the state’s
obligation to secure a strong future economy requires it to ensure that young

20. See, e.g., Bartholet, supra note 15, at 3–4; JAMES G. DWYER & SHAWN F. PETERS,
HOMESCHOOLING: THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF A CONTROVERSIAL PRACTICE 67–68
(2019); Martha Albertson Fineman & George Shepherd, Homeschooling: Choosing Parental Rights Over
Children’s Interests, 46 U. BALT. L. REV. 57, 59–60 (2016); Catherine J. Ross, Fundamentalist Challenges
to Core Democratic Values: Exit and Homeschooling, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 991, 991 (2010);
Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education Off the Grid: Constitutional Restraints on Homeschooling, 96 CALIF. L.
REV. 123, 124 (2008).
21. See infra Section IV.A.
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people gain the human capital needed to participate in meaningful work and
contribute to that future economy.
Part IV considers possible regulatory responses. Current constitutional
doctrine permits the states to require that all students attend some school, be it
public or private. At the same time, millions of parents have embraced the belief
that God requires parents alone to control the education of their children. 22
These parents believe that mere exposure to ideas contrary to their own will
confuse and harm their children. Cognitive development research, however,
shows that by adolescence, young people have adult-like capacity to
comprehend and differentiate discordant ideas. 23
I thus propose that states give parents broad authority to direct children’s
primary educations, including the ability to homeschool. During those years,
oversight should be limited to ensuring that children are making adequate
academic progress. In the secondary years, however, the state’s interest in
ensuring that its citizenry be self-determining and capable of democratic and
workforce participation dictates that it take more affirmative measures with
respect to education. Exposure to competing information and values poses no
critical threat to homeschooled adolescents and ensures that they gain the
capacity to make meaningful choices about the directions their own lives will
take. States should thus adopt strong presumptions against home secondary
schooling. The burden would rest upon parents wishing to homeschool to
demonstrate the capacity and disposition to ensure their children receive
educations consistent with the commitments of the liberal democratic state.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. EDUCATION: FROM HOME TO SCHOOL . . .
AND BACK AGAIN
In the American colonies and the early states, formal institutional
schooling was uncommon. 24 The educations of young people thus lacked the
22. For example, the Home School Legal Defense Association used to describe its mission as “to
preserve and advance the fundamental, God-given, constitutional right of parents and others legally
responsible for their children to direct their education.” Our Mission, HOME SCH. LEGAL DEF. ASS’N,
https://web.archive.org/web/20191220142336/https://hslda.org/content/about/mission.asp [https://
perma.cc/5L4U-TLWS]. But see Our Mission, HOME SCH. LEGAL DEF. ASS’N,
https://hslda.org/post/our-mission [https://perma.cc/KK28-GQ3Z] (last updated Sept. 18, 2019)
(removing reference to “God-given” right and asserting their mission as founded upon the principle
that “[p]arents know their children’s needs and abilities much better than any government official can—
and they’re better able to find ways to meet those needs and nurture those abilities”). Similarly, the
Home Educator’s Association of Virginia comes “from a biblical worldview” and its philosophy is that
“God gives parents the primary responsibility to educate their own children” and that “[p]arental love[,]
. . . understanding, patience[,] . . . and . . . awareness of the needs of the whole child are more important
than teacher-certification requirements.” About HEAV, HOME EDUCATORS ASS’N OF VA.,
https://heav.org/about-heav/ [https://perma.cc/DX4H-N4H4].
23. See infra notes 265–71 and accompanying text.
24. MILTON GAITHER, HOMESCHOOL: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 3 (rev. 2d ed. 2017).
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uniformity created by such institutional systems. Instead, the timing, location,
and content of children’s education varied across communities. Most children
received a basic education in literacy and numeracy through some combination
of parental and hired tutoring, small in-home schools, and private academies. 25
Enslaved children (usually those who worked in plantation owners’ homes
rather than in fields) sometimes received basic education. 26
In the nineteenth century, reformers pushed for the establishment of free
“common” schools funded by communities. 27 By the mid-twentieth century,
common and private regular schooling was firmly entrenched, and the
overwhelming majority of U.S. children attended publicly accredited regular
schools. 28 Homeschooling was almost nonexistent.
Cultural, political, and legal changes then prompted some families to
withdraw their children from regular schooling altogether, initiating a trend
that has continued into this century.
The following sections of this Article place the current practice of
homeschool into historical context. They outline the emergence of common
schools and the developments that have led a significant portion of the
population to eventually reject them.
A.

Nineteenth Century: Common Schools, Compulsory Education, and the
Assimilationist Project

The colonists prized literacy, largely due to the importance of biblical
reading in Protestant theology. 29 There was little official involvement in
education. Across the colonies, scattered ordinances required parents to provide
their children a basic education. 30 Some colonies required townships of a certain
size to fund a “common” school. 31 There is scant evidence that the ordinances
were enforced, however, and noncompliance was the norm. 32
25. JOSEPH F. KETT, RITES OF PASSAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA 1790 TO THE PRESENT
18–22 (1977). As early as the mid-seventeenth century, the New England colonies and Virginia enacted
compulsory education requirements requiring parents to ensure that children became literate.
GAITHER, supra note 24, at 6. Some colonies required towns of a certain size to provide some form of
common, or public, schooling. Connecticut, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New York enacted early
statutes requiring towns of fifty or more families to hire a schoolmaster to teach reading and writing.
Historian Milton Gaither notes, however, that noncompliance with these requirements was the norm.
Id. at 13.
26. GAITHER, supra note 24, at 18–19. After Nat Turner’s 1831 rebellion, however, Southern
states enacted laws that prohibited teaching black people—enslaved or free—to read. Id.
27. Id. at 26.
28. See DWYER & PETERS, supra note 20, at 22.
29. GAITHER, supra note 24, at 6.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 13.
32. Id.
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A number of factors spurred increased state interest in, and control over,
education beginning in the mid-nineteenth century:
First, there was an influx of immigrants into the United States, including
Irish Catholics and other groups whose home languages and cultures differed
from those of the Protestant majority. 33 The settled citizens saw common
schooling as an effective means of assimilating the newly arrived groups into
the (superior) majority culture. 34 As historian David Tyack concluded, “Much
of the drive for compulsory education reflected an animus against parents
considered incompetent to train their children.” 35
Second, common-school reformers like Horace Mann, chair of the
Massachusetts State Board of Education, saw state-funded common schools as
social equalizers. 36 Not only would all children, rich and poor alike, have the
opportunity to learn, but common schools would also instill in them discipline,
strong moral character, and citizenship training. 37
Finally, compulsory education measures helped children escape the
dangers of industrial labor. 38 The proliferation of factories had created demand
for laborers, and children frequently worked long hours in poor conditions for
low pay. 39
In the Northeast and settled parts of the Midwest, free common schools
were well established by the mid-nineteenth century. 40 The South lacked the
long tradition of local schools; common schools became standard only after the
Civil War, when the North required Southern states to enact common school
laws as a condition for readmission to the Union. 41 By the end of the nineteenth

33. DWYER & PETERS, supra note 20, at 10; GAITHER, supra note 24, at 36; ELLWOOD P.
CUBBERLEY, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY AND INTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL HISTORY 335 (1919). Cubberley, an educator and dean of Stanford
Graduate School of Education, wrote that Irish immigrants “had a high degree of illiteracy . . . and the
coming of such large numbers of people, poor and uneducated, who would ultimately become citizens
and voters, awakened a solicitude for our political future . . . which materially aided in the
establishment . . . of public education and the development of state oversight and control.” Id.
34. DWYER & PETERS, supra note 20, at 10; see also CUBBERLEY, supra note 33, at 341 (“The
problem which has faced and still faces the United States is that of assimilating these thousands of
foreigners into our national life and citizenship. We must do this or lose our national character.”).
35. David B. Tyack, Ways of Seeing: An Essay on the History of Compulsory Schooling, 46 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 355, 363 (1976); see also CUBBERLEY, supra note 33, at 341–43.
36. CUBBERLEY, supra note 33, at 167 (“No one did more than [Mann] to establish in the minds
of the American people the conception that education should be universal, non-sectarian, and free[.]”).
37. DWYER & PETERS, supra note 20, at 10–11.
38. Id. at 13.
39. Id.
40. CUBBERLEY, supra note 33, at 65–67, 72–74.
41. GAITHER, supra note 24, at 39.

98 N.C. L. REV. 1347 (2020)

1356

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

century, virtually all states had established common schools and enacted
compulsory school attendance laws. 42
Americans readily accepted common schools and compulsory education
requirements because most people still lived in close-knit small towns or rural
communities. 43 Thus, the early public schools enrolled the children of familiar
neighbors who typically shared race, class, and religious identities. 44
Early public schools were also decidedly nonsecular, and uncontroversially
so, as Bible reading and teaching were regular features of public school
curricula. 45 The Protestant orientation of Bible teaching, however, led Catholic
bishops to create an alternative system of parochial schools. 46
By the late nineteenth century both public schools and compulsory
education laws were well established, and the state—not parents—largely
controlled the education of children. 47
B.

Twentieth Century: Standardization, Secularization, Integration, and the
Retreat from Regular Schools

Schools remained relatively homogenous and largely reinforced
majoritarian cultural norms into the early twentieth century. 48 As the century
progressed, rates of school attendance, particularly in the higher grades, rose
steadily. In 1930, slightly less than fifty percent of children between the ages of
fourteen and sixteen attended school. 49 By 1950, the percentage had increased
to over seventy-seven percent. 50 In 1970, eighty percent of children were
graduating from high school. 51
Schools themselves became larger and education become more
standardized: the school year lengthened, smaller local districts consolidated
into larger units, and school buildings became uniform. 52 Professional
educators’ organizations proliferated. 53 The federal government attached
conditions to the receipt of federal monies, leading to national testing,
standardized textbooks, and uniform curricula. 54
42. DWYER & PETERS, supra note 20, at 12. In 1918, Mississippi became the last state to enact a
compulsory school attendance law. Id.
43. GAITHER, supra note 24, at 38.
44. Id.
45. CUBBERLEY, supra note 33, at 171 (noting that “the right of the Church to dictate the teaching
in the schools was clearly recognized by the State”).
46. DWYER & PETERS, supra note 20, at 16; GAITHER, supra note 24, at 41.
47. DWYER & PETERS, supra note 20, at 18.
48. GAITHER, supra note 24, at 71.
49. Id. at 93.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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Historian Milton Gaither has chronicled these developments and argued
that the contemporary homeschooling movement evolved in direct response to
them. He writes:
This profound expansion and standardization is the fundamental fact
without which the homeschooling phenomenon makes no sense.
Homeschooling . . . was very largely a reaction against the mass culture
of the modern liberal state, a culture realized perhaps most perfectly in
the consolidated public schools located on metropolitan outskirts amidst
the rapidly expanding suburbs. 55
Midcentury saw social and political turmoil, as the nation grappled with
the Vietnam War, fears about the spread of communism, and the civil rights
movement. The U.S. Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education 56 in
1954, declaring the segregation of public schools unconstitutional. 57 Subsequent
decisions mandated additional measures, such as busing, to effectuate
integration. 58
The Court then handed down decisions signaling it would no longer
tolerate religious exercise in public schools. In decisions handed down in 1962
and 1963, the Court held that both school-sponsored prayers and Bible readings
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 59 Many white and
religiously conservative Americans were appalled by the decisions and railed
against the Court that, in the words of one Alabama Congressman, had “put the
Negroes in the schools—now they put God out of the schools.” 60
Criticism of the public education system emerged from both the left and
the right. On the left, parents began to criticize what they perceived to be an
overemphasis on standardization, believing that it stifled individual expression

55. Id.
56. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
57. Id. at 495.
58. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22, 29–32 (1971)
(authorizing busing of students to achieve racial desegregation); Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430,
438–42 (1968) (finding that county’s “freedom of choice” plan, which allowed families to choose their
school, was ineffective at desegregating the school system and holding that the plan violated the U.S.
Constitution).
59. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 433–36 (1962) (finding that New York State violated
the Constitution’s Establishment Clause by creating and requiring a school prayer); Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (holding that no school district can require passages from the Bible
to be read).
60. GAITHER, supra note 24, at 116 (quoting Alabama Representative George Andrews in 1962).
The popular backlash against the Court’s religious exercise decisions stretched to some degree across
racial lines. See Heidi L. Matiyow, Mothers Battle Busing and Nontraditional Education in 1970s Detroit,
in THE HISTORY OF DISCRIMINATION IN U.S. EDUCATION: MARGINALITY, AGENCY, AND POWER
193, 195 (Eileen H. Tamura ed., 2008) (“[T]hese Supreme Court decisions aroused a great deal of
dismay among average Americans—both white and black—who felt that the ‘majority’ of the public
still wanted the inclusion of religious exercises in the public schools.”).
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and led to uncritical conformity. 61 From the right, conservatives worried that
public school values were deviating from their own. 62
Parents’ initial response to the various perceived failings of public
education was not to homeschool, however. Instead, parents sought alternatives
in nonpublic schools that began to proliferate. Some parents enrolled their
children in liberal experimental schools that followed less formal curricula and
embraced countercultural values. 63 A much larger number of conservative
Protestants left for private schools that reflected their religious (and in some
cases, racial) values. 64 These private Christian day schools allowed families to
escape the increasing secularization of the public schools and avoid exposure to
sex education, evolution, and other teaching that conflicted with their beliefs. 65
The Christian schools founded during this period were typically sponsored
by local churches or even small groups of individuals, frequently relying on
curricular materials designed specifically for Christian schools. 66 While many
of them affiliated with Christian school associations like the Association of
Christian Schools International, which was formed in 1978, many more
remained unaffiliated with any group and lacked state accreditation. 67
Antipathy toward accreditation or state oversight was rooted in religious belief.
As one pastor explained, “We believe the head of the Church is Jesus Christ,
and if I let the State become the head of the church, then I will be removing the
Lord from His position[.]” 68 Christian schools thus proliferated in these
decades, but the resistance to registration prevents knowing precisely how many
were formed. Estimates thus vary widely, ranging from 6000 to more than
20,000 in the mid-1980s. 69
Over time, some conservative Christians became dissatisfied with private
schooling for various reasons. For many families, paying tuition was a
challenge. 70 A growing number of parents came to believe that the Bible
demanded that parents alone bear responsibility for educating their children
and required them to directly provide the entirety of children’s educational
experiences. 71 Others simply wanted more time with their children. 72 Parents
61. See GAITHER, supra note 24, at 109.
62. See id. at 115–16.
63. DWYER & PETERS, supra note 20, at 43.
64. See GAITHER, supra note 24, at 116; see also Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 227 (1964)
(declaring unconstitutional a Virginia county’s attempt to avoid integration by closing public schools
from 1959 to 1963 and providing private school scholarships to white children).
65. GAITHER, supra note 24, at 116.
66. See DWYER & PETERS, supra note 20, at 36.
67. GAITHER, supra note 24, at 118.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 119.
72. Id.
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began pulling their children out of Christian day schools to begin
homeschooling in growing numbers. 73
Since the 1980s, the number of families choosing to educate their children
exclusively at home has risen dramatically. 74 The next section discusses the
contemporary practice of homeschooling.
C.

Twenty-First Century: The Current Practice of Homeschooling

Today, most school-aged children continue to attend some regular public
or private school—state-accredited institutions staffed by formally trained
educators. 75 The number of families choosing to homeschool has grown
dramatically since the 1980s, however. In 1980, some 60,000 children were
homeschooled. By 2017, that number had grown to some 1.7 million. 76 The
actual number of children being homeschooled is likely higher 77: because many
states have no provisions that require parents to notify of their intent to
homeschool, it is currently impossible to know the exact number of children
being homeschooled. 78
1. Motivations for Homeschooling
Parents choose to homeschool for a range of secular reasons. Some parents
homeschool because their children are heavily involved in nonacademic
activities such as competitive sports, and homeschooling allows for flexibility in
training and competition. 79 Some parents believe that schools cannot
adequately meet their children’s specific academic needs—either because the
schools are insufficient for typical students or because their children have
special educational needs or are academically gifted. 80 Some parents fear that
their children may face discrimination, endure bullying, or run the risk of
physical harm. 81

73. Id. at 121.
74. Grady, supra note 12 (noting that approximately 1.7 million children, or 3.3% of all K-12
students, were homeschooled in the United States in 2016); see also NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT.,
supra note 12.
75. DWYER & PETERS, supra note 20, at 32.
76. NAT’ L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., supra note 12.
77. Dwyer & Peters estimate that the number of homeschooled children likely reached two
million by 2018. DWYER & PETERS, supra note 20, at 1.
78. Cheryl Fields-Smith, Homeschooling Among Ethnic-Minority Populations, in THE WILEY
HANDBOOK OF HOME EDUCATION 207 (Milton Gaither ed., 2017) [hereinafter THE WILEY
HANDBOOK].
79. Joseph Murphy, Milton Gaither & Christine E. Gleim, The Calculus of Departure: Parent
Motivations for Homeschooling, in THE WILEY HANDBOOK, supra note 78, at 109.
80. DWYER & PETERS, supra note 20, at 92–93.
81. Id. at 94–95; see also Fields-Smith, supra note 78, at 208–09; Murphy et al.,, supra note 79, at
104–05; Karen Hurlbutt-Eastman, Teaching the Child with Exceptional Needs at Home, in THE WILEY
HANDBOOK, supra note 78, at 222.
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The largest group of homeschoolers, however, are conservative Christians
who reject what they perceive to be liberal secularism and moral relativism,
which explicitly omit religious teaching from the typical curricula of regular
schools. 82 These parents wish to instill in their children certain beliefs and
values while shielding them from other views presented in schools.
2. Academic Attainment
There is little reliable data on the academic attainment of homeschooled
students. 83 As Professor Elizabeth Bartholet has observed, it is “almost
impossible” to conduct reliable, quality research into the efficacy of
homeschooling education. 84 The reason is simple: researchers are unable to
identify or locate all homeschooled students. 85 Lax state regulations mean that
homeschoolers can effectively “live off the grid.”86 Many states do not require
homeschoolers to register, and many families simply fail to register even if
technically required to do so. 87 Without the ability to locate the entire
population of homeschoolers, it is impossible to study a representative sample
to evaluate how these students perform on average. 88
Overwhelmingly, states do not require homeschooled children to
participate in standardized testing. 89 Thus, only a subset of the homeschooling
population takes the standardized tests required of students attending regular
schools. 90 Moreover, states do not require parents to report the test results of
homeschooled students who do take the standardized tests. 91 Therefore, data
compiled using results of the subset of homeschooled students who both took

82. Here again, available information is imprecise, but estimates range from two-thirds to ninety
percent. See Bartholet, supra note 15, at 9 n.33 (gathering studies). The 2016 National Center on
Education Statistics reported that sixteen percent of homeschooling parents survey indicated that
religion was their “most important” reason for homeschooling, and fifty-one percent indicated that it
was an “important” reason. See MEGHAN MCQUIGGAN & MAHI MEGRON, PARENT AND FAMILY
INVOLVEMENT IN EDUCATION: RESULTS FROM THE NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD EDUCATION
SURVEYS PROGRAM OF 2016: FIRST LOOK 19 (Sept. 2017).
83. See Bartholet, supra note 15, at 20.
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. Id.; see also infra Part II (summarizing state regulation of homeschooling).
87. Bartholet, supra note 15, at 20.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 39–40. New York, for example, requires students in grades four through eight to take a
standardized test at least every other year and every year in high school. How to Comply with New York’s
Homeschool Law, HSLDA, https://hslda.org/post/how-to-comply-with-new-york-s-homeschool-law
[https://perma.cc/55YL-REGJ]. Pennsylvania requires that children in grades three, five, and eight
take a standardized test. How To Comply with Pennsylvania’s Homeschool Law, HSLDA,
https://hslda.org/post/how-to-comply-with-pennsylvania-s-homeschool-law [https://perma.cc/V5XAWTHW].
90. Bartholet, supra note 15, at 38–40.
91. Id.
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the standardized tests and reported the results is incomplete and provides little
reliable information. 92
Homeschooling advocacy organizations point to anecdotal evidence of
homeschooled children successfully attending postsecondary institutions 93 and
studies finding that homeschoolers’ academic performance exceeds that of their
public school peers. 94 The studies, however, have generally been conducted by
advocacy researchers who are themselves part of the homeschooling
movement. 95 They select subsets of the homeschooling student population—for
example, those who elect to take standardized tests (which are generally not
required of homeschooled students) or those who enter college. Indeed,
reputable academics have assessed and largely discredited the studies. 96

92. See, e.g., Brian D. Ray, Academic Achievement and Demographic Traits of Homeschool Students: A
Nationwide Study, 8 ACAD. LEADERSHIP: ONLINE J. 1 (2010). In this study, Brian Ray enlisted
homeschooling organizations to solicit parents who had paid “fee-for-service” testing organizations to
administer standardized tests to report results to the study’s author. Id. at 5. Ray obtained test results
for 11,739 students. Id. at 6. He stated that “[i]t was very challenging to calculate the response rate[,]”
but the response rates ranged from “a minimum of nineteen percent for the four main testing services”
to an estimated eleven percent “[f]or the other testing services and sources of data[.]” Id. at 7. He
concluded that “[t]he response rate for this study [was] comparable to what many experience in this
type of social science research. On the other hand, the response rate in this study is lower than in many
social science studies.” Id.
93. See Wilkens et al., Are Homeschoolers Prepared for College Calculus?, 9 J. SCH. CHOICE 30, 31
(2015).
94. See, e.g., Ray, supra note 92, at 2. Ray stated that “[h]omeschool student achievement test
scores are exceptionally high. The mean scores for every subtest (which are at least the 80th percentile)
are well above those of public school students.” Id. at 27. He conceded, however, that “it was not
possible within the constraints of this study to confirm whether this sample is representative of the
population of home-educated students.” Id. at 28. It is possible that the families that voluntarily opt in
to standardized testing are a subset whose more rigorous programs make them confident that their
children will perform well on such tests.
95. Sandra Martin-Chang & Kyle Levesque, Academic Achievement: Making an Informed Choice
About Homeschooling, in THE WILEY HANDBOOK, supra note 78, at 122 (“[T]he majority of the work
investigating the academic impact of homeschooling has been commissioned by the homeschooling
groups themselves.”). The National Home Education Research Institute (NHERI), founded by Brian
D. Ray as the research arm of HSLDA, has published multiple such studies. NHERI publishes an
online journal called Homeschool Researcher that contains both peer-reviewed and non-peer-reviewed
articles. Milton Gaither critically assesses Brian Ray’s studies in Milton Gaither, Brian D. Ray and
NHERI, Part 1, HOMESCHOOLING RESEARCH NOTES (Sept. 30, 2008), https://
gaither.wordpress.com/2008/09/30/brian-d-ray-and-nheri-part-1/ [https://perma.cc/99RQ-EJ2H].
96. See, e.g., Milton Gaither, Introduction to the Wiley Handbook of Home Education, in THE WILEY
HANDBOOK, supra note 78, at 2 (“It is unfortunately the case that for decades a good bit of what has
passed for homeschooling research has been little more than thinly veiled advocacy or opposition.”);
Robert Kunzman & Milton Gaither, Homeschooling: A Comprehensive Survey of the Research, 2 OTHER
EDUC. 4, 5–6 (2013); Christopher Lubienski, Tiffany Puckett & T. Jameson Brewer, Does
Homeschooling “Work”? A Critique of the Empirical Claims and Agenda of Advocacy Organizations, 88
PEABODY J. EDUC. 378, 379, 390 (2013) (“[T]here is essentially no scientific evidence on the
effectiveness of homeschooling.”); Wilkens et al., supra note 93, at 31 (“Work on the performance of
homeschoolers . . . has remained largely anecdotal, subject to bias, and highly politicized[.]”).
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Homeschooling advocates counter that regular schools, and particularly
public schools, succeed unevenly at best in educating students and preparing
them for the workforce. 97 It is beyond dispute that many state-funded schools
do not serve all children well. 98 At the same time, however, standardized
assessments and transparency provide both educators and legislators with
critical information about the quality of instruction, thus informing them of the
nature of needed reform. 99 No comparable level of transparency exists with
respect to the educations received by children educated exclusively within the
home. Indeed, states do not collect data that would allow for systematic
assessment of homeschooled students’ academic progress. Available evidence
suggests, however, that many homeschooled children do not receive educations
adequate to prepare them for postsecondary study. 100 In one case, Josh Powell,
a child whose parents homeschooled him in southern Virginia, petitioned his
local school board to admit him to a public school. 101 Powell insisted that he did
not share his parents’ religious objections to public education and was receiving
an inadequate education at home. 102 The school board denied his request, but
Powell eventually enrolled in a local community college with financial aid and
spent three years taking remedial and other courses. 103
97. See, e.g., Brian D. Ray, A Brief Review of “Taking Children’s Interests Seriously” by Fineman,
NAT’L HOME EDUC. RES. INST. (Jan. 10, 2012), https://www.nheri.org/home-school-researcher-abrief-review-of-taking-childrens-interests-seriously-by-fineman/
[https://perma.cc/8BGG-7RLX]
(observing that “Fineman did not bother to mention the drop-out, illiteracy, or incarceration rates
amongst graduates of State K-12 schools in America”).
98. See, e.g., Tawnell D. Hobbs, Students Show Declines in Nation’s Report Card, WALL STREET J.
(Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/students-show-declines-in-nations-report-card11572433205 [https://perma.cc/GRG2-NCD6].
99. To give just one example, in 2017, pursuant to a 2004 decision, a North Carolina trial court
appointed a third-party consultant to evaluate the state’s public schools and prepare a comprehensive
action plan aimed at redressing the school system’s shortcomings. See Consent Order Regarding Need
for Remedial Systemic Actions for the Achievement of Leandro Compliance at 9–10, Hoke Cty. Bd. of
Educ. v. State, 358 N.C. 605, 599 S.E.2d 365 (2004) (No. 95-CVS-1158), https://
wwwcache.wral.com/asset/opinion/2020/01/22/18903814/File-stamped_Order_dated_1-21-2019_2_2DMID1-5ll9qshro.PDF [https://perma.cc/Q4GB-HN8X]. The commission found that the state’s
“current education system fails to meet the educational needs of many of its children.” Id. The
consultant and two independent organizations enlisted research teams who produced thirteen research
reports, then prepared and published a comprehensive action plan. See WESTED, LEARNING POLICY
INST. & THE WILLIAM & IDA FRIDAY INST. FOR EDUC. INNOVATION, SOUND BASIC EDUCATION
FOR ALL: AN ACTION PLAN FOR NORTH CAROLINA 1–2 (2019), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/12/Sound-Basic-Education-for-All-An-Action-Plan-for-North-Carolina.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T9T7-NSNX].
100. For a discussion and comparison of reliable and unreliable research see Bartholet, supra note
15, at 5, 20–26.
101. See Susan Svrluga, Student’s Home-Schooling Highlights Debate Over Va. Religious Exemption
Law, WASH. POST (July 28, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/students-home-schoolinghighlights-debate-over-va-religious-exemption-law/2013/07/28/ee2dbb1a-efbc-11e2-bed3b9b6fe264871 _story.html [https://perma.cc/5L3K-DJAH (dark archive)].
102. Id.
103. Id.
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In some conservative fundamentalist families, boys may receive higher
levels of education than girls, as parents provide lesser levels of education for
their daughters than for their sons. 104 This unequal treatment is grounded in the
belief that the only proper role for a woman is as a mother and wife. 105 Although
data is lacking, the existing evidence is troubling and suggests that girls
educated in these families are left ill-prepared to embark on any life course other
than the domestic roles determined by their parents. 106
We therefore have no reliable means of knowing how many homeschooled
children fail to receive adequate schooling.
3. Children’s Welfare
It is currently impossible to know whether rates of maltreatment are
higher in homeschooling families than in families with children who attend
public schools. In the absence of state-imposed reporting requirements,
homeschooling families may live in relative—or total—isolation.
This isolation results in homeschooled children having little or no contact
with teachers and other officials who are required by law to report suspected
abuse or neglect. 107 These officials are trained to observe whether children are
adequately clothed and fed, injured, or possess behaviors that may signal trauma
at home. There is evidence that some abusive parents have taken advantage of
lax homeschooling regulations, effectively hiding their children from these
mandatory reporters. 108
Evidence also suggests that homeschooling carries increased risk of abuse
and neglect. One study compared the rate of child abuse fatalities among
homeschooling families to the rate of child abuse fatalities overall. 109 It found a
higher rate of death due to maltreatment among homeschooled children than
among children of the same age overall. 110 Milton Gaither has voiced concerns
about the risk of maltreatment, noting that “[p]rofessionals responsible for child

104. The Quiverfull movement, for example, teaches homeschooled girls to be submissive and to
aspire only to marry and procreate. See Katherine Stewart, The Dark Side of Home Schooling: Creating
Soldiers for the Culture War, GUARDIAN (May 8, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com
/commentisfree/2013/may/08/christian-home-schooling-dark-side [https://perma.cc/P56V-X8YQ].
105. GAITHER, supra note 24, at 255; Bartholet, supra note 15, at 10–12.
106. In Section III.A, I discuss how these educational practices constitute a form of “otherdetermining” conduct that contravenes core commitments of the liberal state. See infra Section III.A.
107. Bartholet, supra note 15, at 14.
108. See Green, supra note 14, at 1097–98.
109. Some Preliminary Data on Homeschool Child Fatalities, HOMESCHOOLING’S INVISIBLE
CHILDREN, http://hsinvisiblechildren.org/commentary/some-preliminary-data-on-homeschool-childfatalities/ [https://perma.cc/M78H-UX5L].
110. Id.
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services have long been wary of the potential for unregulated homeschooling to
serve as a cloak for child abuse.” 111
Child abuse pediatricians from five U.S. medical centers studied the most
severe cases of child abuse (those involving child torture) and found that over
three-fourths of the school-aged children were not attending any regular
school. 112 Nearly half had attended some school, but their parents removed them
for homeschooling. The authors noted that the parents’ decision to remove the
children “typically occurred after closure of a previously opened CPS case,” and
their review “found no true educational efforts were provided to the
homeschooled children.”113 Instead, “[t]heir isolation was accompanied by an
escalation of physically abusive events.” 114
The cases studied by the child abuse pediatricians are extreme cases and
not typical of homeschooling families. What these cases do illustrate, however,
is that homeschooling can provide effective cover for abusive or neglectful
parents.
II. THE LAW OF HOMESCHOOLING
It is the interest of youth itself, and of the whole community, that children be
both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and
independent well-developed men and citizens. 115
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed a number of cases involving the
extent of state authority over children’s education. In those cases, the Court has
acknowledged state authority to “reasonably . . . regulate all schools” and “to
require that all children of proper age attend some school.” 116 State power is not
unlimited, however, and the Court has struck down regulations it deemed
overly far reaching. 117

111. Milton Gaither, Two Brief Articles on Homeschooling and Child Abuse, INT’L CTR. FOR HOME
EDUC. RES. REV. (Mar. 29, 2013), http://icher.org/blog/?p=638 [https://perma.cc/P7WM-ET3X].
112. Barbara L. Knox et al., Child Torture as a Form of Child Abuse, 7 J. CHILD & ADOLESCENT
TRAUMA 37, 38–39 (2014) (stating that pediatricians specializing in child abuse and working at medical
centers in Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin identified and conducted case studies of
twenty-eight cases of extreme child abuse).
113. Id. at 39.
114. Id.
115. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
116. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
117. See, e.g., Pierce, 268 U.S. at 510 (striking down a state law that required all children to attend
public rather than private schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 390–91 (1923) (striking down a
state law that prohibited the teaching of foreign languages in the elementary grades).
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Lower federal courts and state courts, under both the federal and state
constitutions, have overwhelmingly upheld state regulations of education
broadly and homeschooling in particular. 118
Although homeschooling advocates have foundered in the courts, they
have achieved significant gains at the state legislative level. The Home School
Legal Defense Association (“HSLDA”) has mounted aggressive lobbying
campaigns, and with no similarly committed (or similarly resourced)
constituencies challenging its efforts, has achieved gains in the legislatures that
it has failed to achieve through the courts. 119
This part discusses both the scope of parents’ constitutional right to direct
their children’s educations and the extent to which state law governs
homeschooling.
A.

The Constitutionally Derived Parental Right To Direct the Education of
Children, and Its Limits

The Supreme Court has implicitly held that the U.S. Constitution does
not protect a parental right to homeschool one’s children. 120 In People v.
Turner, 121 the State of California prosecuted homeschooling parents for
violating a state compulsory school attendance statute that required parents to
enroll their children in either public or private school. 122 The parents challenged
the law on two grounds. First, they argued that “private schools” should be

118. See infra Section II.B.; see also, e.g., Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 231 (3d
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1138 (2009) (holding that a state law requiring parents of
homeschooled children to comply with reporting and superintendent review requirements was not
unconstitutional); Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039, 1039–40 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding against
constitutional challenge a state law requiring parents of homeschooled children to notify the state,
provide curriculum information, and submit children to annual standardized tests); Null v. Bd. of
Educ., 815 F. Supp. 937, 937 (S.D. W.Va. 1993) (upholding a state statute imposing testing
requirement and denying parents’ right to homeschool if test scores fall below certain percentile);
Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 106, 113 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (upholding regulations that
included home visits and required homeschooling parents to submit plan of instruction and description
of instructor qualifications); In re Charles, 504 N.E.2d 592, 592 (Mass. 1987) (upholding against
constitutional challenge a state statute establishing process for approval of home school that required
parents to outline curriculum and provide qualifications of instructors). But see People v. DeJonge, 501
N.W.2d 127, 127, 144 (Mich. 1993) (subjecting teaching certification requirement for homeschooling
to strict scrutiny under state constitution and holding that the requirement violated the Free Exercise
Clause). A later decision by the Sixth Circuit found that rational basis was the appropriate standard of
review in such cases, however, which undermines the legal foundation of DeJonge. Kissinger v. Bd. of
Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180–81 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Bartholet, supra note 15, at 34
n.196.
119. See infra Section II.C.
120. See Turner v. California, 347 U.S. 972, 972 (1954) (dismissing homeschooling parents’ appeal
for lack of a substantial federal question).
121. 263 P.2d 685 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2d 1953).
122. Id. at 686.
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interpreted to include homeschooling. 123 Second, they argued that if the statute
did prohibit homeschooling, it unconstitutionally “deprive[d] parents of the
right to determine how and where their children may be educated.” 124 The
California appellate court rejected both arguments. It relied on U.S. Supreme
Court precedent to find that the state regulation fell within the state’s power
“reasonably to regulate” education and to require school attendance. 125 The
parents appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, but then issued a summary
dismissal of the appeal due to the absence of a “substantial federal question.” 126
The Court thus determined that the issues presented by the case turned on
neither a federal statute nor a constitutional provision—such as the Fourteenth
Amendment right to direct the education of one’s children. In other words, the
state’s prohibition of homeschooling substantially implicated no
constitutionally protected parental right. Without a written opinion that
explicitly articulates the Court’s reasoning, however, Turner has been largely
overlooked. 127
The Court has decided numerous cases that have not squarely addressed
homeschooling but that have considered other limits to states’ authority to
regulate education. It has located a parental right to direct the upbringing and
education of children in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which states in part that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.” 128 The Court has also interpreted the
Clause to provide not only procedural protections, but also to protect certain
substantive liberties—including family autonomy—from state interference. 129
In a well-known trio of cases in the early twentieth century, the Court
announced that parents have a fundamental right to direct the upbringing and
education of their children, but that the state retains “a wide range of power for
limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s
welfare.” 130
In Meyer v. Nebraska,131 a German language teacher challenged a state law
limiting the teaching of foreign languages to children in later grades. 132 The
123. Id.
124. Id. at 686–87.
125. Id. at 687.
126. Turner v. California, 347 U.S. 972, 972 (containing Justices Black and Reed’s disagreement
with the dismissal based on their belief that there was “probable jurisdiction”).
127. DWYER & PETERS, supra note 20, at 57–58 (characterizing Turner as a “lost artifact in
American constitutional history”).
128. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
129. Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63, 70–72 (2006).
130. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165–67 (1944).
131. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
132. Id. at 396–97.
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Court held this effort to prevent teachers from engaging in certain instruction
to be unreasonable. The Court emphasized the relatively narrow scope of its
holding and did not suggest a broader limitation on the state’s power to regulate
education and compel school attendance, noting that
education of the young is only possible in schools conducted by especially
qualified persons . . . . The power of the State to compel attendance at
some school and to make reasonable regulations for all schools . . . is not
questioned. Nor has challenge been made of the State’s power to
prescribe a curriculum. 133
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 134 the Court sided with a group
of private schools and struck down a state statute that required all children to
attend public school. 135 In doing so, the Court again remarked on the expansive
state power to regulate schools, and to compel student attendance at some
regular school, be it public or private. 136 The Court explained that its decision
did not limit these state powers, noting that
[n]o question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to
regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their
teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend some
school . . . that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must
be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the
public welfare. 137
Meyer and Pierce involved challenges to state efforts to regulate aspects of
children’s education. Schools and teachers affected by the regulations brought
the challenges in each of the cases (rather than parents), but the Court’s opinion
in each case addressed the relative balance of authority.
Finally, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 138 the Court upheld the enforcement of
state laws restricting child labor against a child’s guardian who asserted that the
restrictions violated her parental, religious freedom, and equal protection rights
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 139 As in its earlier cases,
the Prince Court acknowledged that “the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents.” 140 It went on to hold, however, that the state’s
obligation to protect children’s welfare entitled it to supersede parental
authority. 141
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 400–02.
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Id. at 534–35.
Id. at 534.
Id.
321 U.S. 158 (1943).
Id. at 158–59, 168–70.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 166–69.
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This trio of cases—Meyer, Pierce, and Prince—demonstrates the delicate
balance between a state’s interest in regulating education and the individual
right to raise one’s children. As the subsequent cases illustrate, this balance
becomes even more complicated with the added element of religious liberty
rights.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder 142 —a 1972 decision relied on by homeschooling
advocates in subsequent claims—the Court exempted adolescents in Old Order
Amish communities from compulsory education requirements beyond the
eighth grade. 143 The Amish claimed the requirements violated their rights to
free exercise of religious beliefs protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment. 144 The Amish religion teaches that salvation requires life in
a church community entirely separate from worldly influences and in harmony
with nature. 145 Because the Amish faith and way of life requires separation from
modern society and culture, the Court found that “compulsory school
attendance to age 16 for Amish children carries with it a very real threat of
undermining the Amish community.” 146 Given that the Amish community had
existed with relative success and self-sufficiency while separate from the broader
society for centuries, the Court held that “accommodating the religious
objections . . . will not impair the physical or mental health of the child, or result
in an inability to be self-supporting or to discharge the duties and
responsibilities of citizenship.” 147
The Yoder Court noted that the state’s compulsory education requirement
implicated not only the right to religious exercise but also “the fundamental
interest of parents” to direct their children’s upbringing. 148 It thus grounded its
holding in both the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 149
Additionally, the Court’s opinion emphasized the distinctiveness of sects
like the Amish and Mennonites, which have lived separate from mainstream
society for centuries. 150 The Court thus hinted that Yoder presented an
exceptional situation, and that its holding resulted from the sect’s “convincing
showing, one that probably few other religious groups or sects could make.” 151
142. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
143. Id. at 205–06, 219, 234.
144. Id. at 208–09, 209 n.4.
145. Id. at 210.
146. Id. at 218.
147. Id. at 234.
148. Id. at 232.
149. Id. at 234 (“[W]e hold . . . that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the State from
compelling respondents to cause their children to attend formal high school to age 16.”). The Court
has held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause guarantees not only fair process but
“also provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights
and liberty interests.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719–20 (1997).
150. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235.
151. Id. at 235–36 (emphasis added).
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Some two decades later, the Court held in Employment Division v. Smith 152
that free exercise challenges to neutral, generally-applicable laws would not
trigger heightened judicial review. 153 The Smith Court suggested, however, that
challenges involving free exercise in conjunction with other constitutional
protections—like the right of parents to direct the education of children—
present “hybrid” situations that warranted heightened scrutiny of state action. 154
Homeschooling proponents have accordingly sought heightened
constitutional protection for parents’ religiously grounded education
decisions. 155 But while the Supreme Court’s “hybrid-rights” theory has spawned
a circuit split and considerable commentary, it has not led to substantial
expansion of such protections. 156 In sum, Yoder and Smith have not led to the
extension of heightened protection for homeschooling parents. 157
Since Yoder, the Supreme Court has not decided another case implicating
both free exercise and parental rights. A decade after Smith, however, the Court
did have occasion to further explain the contours of the fundamental right to
parent. In Troxel v. Granville, 158 a parent challenged a state statute that
permitted courts to grant grandparents visitation with their grandchildren
without any deference to parents’ preferences. 159 The Court found that, in
ordering visitation over the objection of a fit custodial parent, the trial judge
152. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
153. Id. at 882–86. Instead, such challenges would be subject only to rational basis review—a
deferential standard in which state legislation is upheld against constitutional challenge so long as it is
rationally related to some legitimate state objective. See id. at 882–90.
154. Id. at 881–82.
155. See, e.g., Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 249–50 (3d Cir. 2008) (describing
Christian homeschooling parents’ argument that “parents claiming a religious-parental exemption to a
neutral law of general applicability” should receive the same heightened scrutiny as was applied in
Yoder).
156. See, e.g., San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2004)
(recognizing hybrid rights when plaintiffs raise a “colorable claim that a companion right has been
violated”); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1295 (10th Cir. 2004) (permitting a hybrid-rights
claim for a Mormon student who refused to use expletives in an acting class exercise). But see Combs,
540 F.3d at 246–47 (declining to recognize a hybrid-rights claim and explaining that “[u]ntil the
Supreme Court provides direction, we believe the hybrid-rights theory to be dicta”); Kissinger v. Bd.
of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) (declining to subject “hybrid” claim to
heightened standard of review “at least until the Supreme Court holds that legal standards under the
Free Exercise Clause vary depending on whether [a free-exercise claim is coupled with other
constitutional rights].”). For an example of scholarly analyses of the Court’s hybrid-rights theory see
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1122
(1990) (“[A] legal realist would tell us . . . that the Smith Court’s notion of ‘hybrid’ claims was not
intended to be taken seriously.”).
157. See, e.g., Combs, 540 F.3d at 251 (rejecting parents’ requested exemption from reporting and
review requirements and concluding that “the claim raised by the Amish parents in Yoder can be
distinguished from the claim raised by Parents here. [The challenged regulation] does not threaten
Parents’ or their community’s entire mode of life.”).
158. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
159. Id. at 60–61.
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erroneously placed the burden on the parent to disprove that visitation would be
in the children’s best interests. 160 The Court emphasized that “the interest of
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest
of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.” 161 But rather
than explicitly subjecting the state statute to strict scrutiny—the standard to
which state action that interferes with fundamental rights is typically
subjected—the Court applied a murky standard that stopped short of its highest
standard of review. 162 Moreover, the Court directed lower courts reviewing a fit
parent’s decision regarding visitation in these circumstances to give only an
“unspecified ‘special weight’ to the parent’s interest.” 163
B.

Challenges to States’ Regulation of Homeschooling: State and Lower Federal
Courts

Since the 1980s, homeschooling parents have challenged a range of states’
efforts to oversee and regulate in-home education, including outright bans on
the practice. 164 The parents—particularly those holding fundamentalist views—
argue that the state has no proper role in overseeing the education of their
children. These challenges have typically failed, with courts generally subjecting
regulations to the deferential rational basis standard of review. 165
In some challenges, parents have claimed that state regulations violate
their First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion. 166 Courts have
subjected these state regulations to heightened review or strict scrutiny
(although not consistently, and not always explicitly). 167 Under strict scrutiny,
states must show that the regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling

160. Id. at 69.
161. Id. at 65.
162. See Michael J. Higdon, The Quasi-Parent Conundrum, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 941, 946 (2019)
(casting the Troxel standard as “extremely vague” and describing resulting confusion among lower
courts regarding application of the resulting quasi-parent doctrine).
163. David D. Meyer, Family Law Equality at a Crossroads, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1231, 1245
(2013).
164. For discussion of various challenges to state regulation see JUSTIN DRIVER, THE
SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: PUBLIC EDUCATION, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE
AMERICAN MIND 400–04 (2018), and Bartholet, supra note 15, at 27–32.
165. See Terri Dobbins Baxter, Private Oppression: How Laws That Protect Privacy Can Lead to
Oppression, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 415, 458–61 (2010); see also Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039, 1044
(8th Cir. 1988) (applying rational basis review and upholding state regulations of homeschooling).
166. See, e.g., Duro v. Dist. Attorney, 712 F.2d 96, 96–97 (4th Cir. 1983).
167. See State v. Patzer, 382 N.W.2d 631, 636, 639 (N.D. 1986) (upholding teaching certification
requirement under strict scrutiny); Duro, 712 F.2d at 97–99 (applying strict scrutiny to parent’s free
exercise challenge and holding that the state’s compelling interest in education justified its compulsory
school attendance law). But see Crites v. Smith, 826 S.W.2d 459, 466–67 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991)
(appearing to apply rational basis review to parents’ claim that degree requirement violated their free
exercise and parental rights).
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government interest—a difficult standard to satisfy. 168 But even under strict
scrutiny, courts have typically found state regulations of homeschooling
justified in light of states’ compelling interest in children’s education. 169
Applying both federal and state constitutional standards, courts reject
claims to absolute parental authority and, with few exceptions, regularly uphold
state regulation of homeschooling. Courts have upheld outright state bans on
homeschooling, 170 as well as a range of other regulations, including curriculum
standards and annual reporting requirements, 171 minimum parent qualification
requirements, 172 instructional time requirements, 173 required submission of
student portfolios for review, 174 home visits, 175 and standardized testing. 176
On the other hand, courts have only rarely overturned state regulations in
these areas. 177 Brunelle v. Lynn Public Schools 178 is one of the few cases where a
court invalidated a state regulation in favor of a homeschooling parent. In
Brunelle, homeschooling parents in Massachusetts challenged the state’s
requirement of home visits by a state official as a condition to approval of
parents’ homeschooling plan. 179 The parents’ home education plans satisfied
168. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (holding that a state’s burden under a strict
scrutiny standard is “subjected to the most rigid scrutiny” and mandates a showing that the law is
“necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective”) (internal quotations omitted).
169. See, e.g., Blount v. Dep’t of Educ. & Cultural Servs., 551 A.2d 1377, 1383, 1385–86 (Me. 1988)
(upholding against First Amendment challenge a state requirement that parents intending to
homeschool receive prior approval and meet certain instructor requirements); Patzer, 382 N.W.2d at
636, 639 (holding that teacher certification requirement survives strict scrutiny review).
170. See, e.g., Duro, 712 F.2d at 98–99.
171. See State v. Rivera, 497 N.W. 2d 878, 880–81 (Iowa 1993) (holding that upon “setting
minimum educational standards[,] the state is also empowered to adopt reasonable requirements to
assure that those standards are honored”).
172. See, e.g., Crites, 826 S.W.2d at 466–67 (rejecting challenge to state requirement that parents
hold baccalaureate degree or equivalent); Blount, 551 A.2d at 1383, 1385 (upholding instructor
requirements).
173. See Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 237, 252 (3d Cir. 2008).
174. See id. at 238, 252; see also In re Ivan, 717 N.E.2d 1020, 1022–23 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999);
Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 113 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).
175. See Blackwelder, 689 F. Supp. at 113, 135, 137; In re Kilroy, 121 Misc. 2d 98, 102 (N.Y. Fam.
Ct. 1983).
176. See Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039, 1042–43 (8th Cir. 1988); In re Ivan, 717 N.E.2d at
1022–23.
177. See, e.g., People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127, 140–44 (Mich. 1993) (invalidating a teacher
certification requirement as applied to homeschooling parents who raised a free exercise challenge and
were otherwise providing an adequate education); Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571,
590 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (finding homeschools to be included in the statutory definition of ‘private
full-time day schools’ and thus entitled to exemption from compulsory attendance law); Perchemlides
v. Frizzle, No. 16641, 27–28 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1978), http://www.mhla.org/information
/massdocuments/perchemlidesdecision.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DEN-ASAS] (holding school
superintendent could not require that homeschoolers have a social experience equivalent to that of
students in public schools).
178. 702 N.E.2d 1182 (Mass. 1998).
179. Id. at 1183–84.

98 N.C. L. REV. 1347 (2020)

1372

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

other state-imposed criteria—submission of curriculum, demonstrated
competence of parents as instructors, minimum hours of instructions, and
periodic evaluation of students. 180
The court explained that Massachusetts courts had interpreted state law
to provide that “approval of a home school proposal must not be conditioned
on requirements that are not essential to the State interest in ensuring that ‘all
the children shall be educated,’” and that state officials may enforce only
“reasonable educational requirements similar to those required for public and
private schools.” 181 The court surveyed the laws of other states and found that
only one state routinely subjected homeschoolers to home visits. 182 The court
therefore held that, consistent with the approaches of an overwhelming majority
of states, home visits were not essential to Massachusetts’ interest in ensuring
that children were receiving an education and that parents were implementing
the home instruction plan. 183 The court also noted its concern that requiring
such “visits may call into play issues of family privacy in seeking to keep the
home free of unwarranted intrusion.”184
C.

Deregulation of Homeschooling

Homeschooling advocates have thus found little success in the courts when
challenging state regulations. Conversely, they have been extremely successful
in state legislatures. 185 Their success is largely due to the efforts of homeschool
advocacy organizations, led by HSLDA since its founding in 1983. In the past,
HSLDA has stated that its mission was “to preserve and advance the
fundamental, God-given, constitutional right of parents and others legally
responsible for their children to direct their education.” 186 HSLDA tracks
proposed state legislation and mobilizes its members to overwhelm legislative
offices to express their opposition.
The specific experiences of one state legislator demonstrate HSLDA’s
effectiveness: New Jersey Senate Majority Leader Loretta Weinberg
introduced legislation in response to a 2003 report that local police discovered
four severely malnourished children when a neighbor reported the eldest (at age
nineteen, he stood four feet tall and weighed forty-five pounds) rummaging
180. Id. at 1183.
181. Id. at 1184 (quoting In re Charles, 504 N.E.2d 592, 600 (Mass. 1987)).
182. Id. at 1185. The court noted that the Nebraska law that was interpreted to require home visits
had originally been designed to regulate traditional private schools and required evaluation of the safety
of building and grounds. Id. at 1185.
183. Id. at 1186–87.
184. Id. at 1186.
185. See Bartholet, supra note 15, at 37–38 (explaining that homeschooling advocates have
“managed to legitim[ize] homeschooling in all states and to eliminate almost all meaningful
restrictions,” as well as successfully blocking proposed regulations).
186. See HOME SCH. LEGAL DEF. ASS’N, supra note 22.
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through garbage. 187 The children were being homeschooled, so they had escaped
regular observation by anyone but family members. 188 Senator Weinberg’s
proposed 2004 bill would have required parents to notify the state of their
intent to homeschool, submit proof of annual physicals, and complete the same
annual testing as public school students. 189 HSLDA sent multiple emails urging
members to take action to oppose the bill, claiming that it would “devastate
homeschooling in New Jersey.” 190 Weinberg reported that soon after the bill’s
introduction, homeschooling parents began following her around the capitol.
“Hundreds and hundreds” of phone calls from homeschool advocates
overwhelmed her office phone lines, requiring her staff to use their private cell
phones to conduct business. Feeling “besieged,” Weinberg withdrew the bill. 191
After the 2011 death of a homeschooled New Jersey child, 192 other
legislators joined Weinberg in reintroducing bills in 2011, 193 2012, 194 and 2014, 195
making changes intended to minimize the opposition from homeschool
advocates. 196 Despite the changes, which included replacing a testing
requirement with simple mandatory review of students’ portfolios, the bills
failed in the face of ongoing HSLDA resistance. 197
As of 2019, New Jersey law only required parents to enroll their children
in a regular school or otherwise ensure that they “receive equivalent instruction
elsewhere than at school.” 198 Parents have no obligation to inform the local or
state board of education of their intent to homeschool, nor are they required to
meet any requirements with respect to curriculum or testing. Instead, the State
Department of Education advises that parents “are responsible for the
educational outcomes of the child . . . [and t]he local board of education is not
required or authorized to monitor the outcomes of the child.” 199
187. Jessica Huseman, Small Group Goes to Great Lengths To Block Homeschooling Regulation,
PROPUBLICA (Aug. 27, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/small-group-goes-greatlengths-to-block-homeschooling-regulation [https://perma.cc/22UJ-C97Y].
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. HLSDA sent electronic messages to its members urging action on May 13, 14, 18, 21, 26 and
28. Id.
191. Id.
192. See generally Susan K. Livio & James Queally, Reports of Neglect Made Against Mother of
Irvington Girl Who Died, but Charges Not Substantiated, NJ.COM (May 25, 2011), https://
www.nj.com/news/2011/05/five_reports_of_abuse_and_negl.html [https://perma.cc/8L7U-C76C].
193. S. 3105, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2011).
194. Assemb. 2881, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2012).
195. Assemb. 2700, 216th Leg. (N.J. 2014).
196. The 2014 bill, for example, only required notification of intent to homeschool, medical
examination, and submission of student work portfolio. Id.
197. See Huseman, supra note 187.
198. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:38-25 (Westlaw through 2020 legislation).
199. Frequently Asked Questions: Homeschooling, N.J. DEP’T EDUC., https://www.state.nj.us
/education/genfo/faq/faq_homeschool.htm [https://perma.cc/7A7J-U3N3].
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The experience of New Jersey legislators is typical. HSLDA and other
organizations’ grassroots mobilization of energetic and persistent
homeschoolers regularly pressures legislators to withdraw proposed legislation
and deters others from supporting such regulations. Dwyer and Peters observe
that
at the state level, the best explanation for HSLDA legislative success
might not be any superior knowledge of the law but rather the
organization’s ability to foment outrage among homeschoolers in any
state contemplating a regulation, causing any legislator who supported
the regulation to become the victim of a relentless barrage of hostile
communications—occasionally including death threats—by mail, email,
and office visits. 200
Thus, despite judicial decisions confirming that robust regulation of
homeschooling will withstand legal challenges in the courts, state legislatures
have instead steadily withdrawn their oversight of the educations of
homeschooled children. As a result, parents have near-absolute authority over
their children’s educations and experiences.
For example, nearly half of all states allow parents to homeschool children
without having any meaningful contact with education officials. 201 A dozen of
these states do not require parents to notify the state of their intent to
homeschool. Another ten require a one-time notification, after which they may
avoid any ongoing outside contact. 202 At least fourteen states impose no
curricular requirements. 203 Nine states do impose some assessment requirement
(typically maintaining some record of progress or submitting to standardized
testing), but these are frequently not enforced or state officials grant parents
exemptions from compliance. 204 Only ten states require parents to have some
academic qualifications—typically to have completed high school or obtained a
GED. 205 However, some provide religious exemptions or permit parents who
lack a high school degree or its equivalent to demonstrate in some other way
their capacity to teach. 206
Four states exempt families whose decision to homeschool is religiously
motivated from complying with otherwise applicable regulations. 207 Virginia
law, for example, requires “compulsory school attendance,” a requirement that
200. DWYER & PETERS, supra note 20, at 64.
201. See Bartholet, supra note 15, at 38 (citing Jeffrey Shulman, 50-State Survey: Home School
Regulations: Notification, Certification, Curriculum and Assessment Requirements (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author)).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 39.
204. Id.; see also DWYER & PETERS, supra note 20, at 67–69.
205. DWYER & PETERS, supra note 20, at 68.
206. Id.; Bartholet, supra note 15, at 33.
207. See infra notes 208, 213 and accompanying text.
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can be satisfied by homeschool instruction if the child’s parents have at least a
high school degree, enroll the child in a distance learning program, or submit
evidence that they can provide an adequate education. 208 Parents must annually
notify their local school board of their intent to homeschool and provide a
description of the curriculum. 209 And parents must demonstrate their children’s
educational progress by submitting the scores from a standardized test or some
other assessment demonstrating “an adequate level of educational growth and
progress.” 210 However, if parents receive a religious exemption, the
Commonwealth exempts them from even these minimal requirements. 211
Parents seeking an exemption may submit to their local superintendent a
statement that, together with their child, they are “by reason of bona fide
religious training or belief . . . conscientiously opposed to attendance at
school.” 212 After providing this one-time notice, the Commonwealth imposes
no further educational requirement at all. 213 Three additional states (Iowa,
Kansas, and South Dakota) also allow religious exemptions but require ongoing
“learning activities” or grant officials authority to require proof of educational
progress. 214
Thus, across virtually all of the United States, state laws permit parents to
keep their children away from school altogether, allowing these parents to
provide whatever instruction they choose without accountability measures in
place to ensure that their children are making educational progress.
III. THE STATE’S INTERESTS IN EDUCATION
Part I explained the evolution of the contemporary practice of
homeschooling in the United States and described the motives that have led
many parents to remove their children from regular schools. Part II described
the law of homeschooling as it currently stands, showing that there is no
208. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-254.1(A) (2019).
209. Id. § 22.1-254.1(B).
210. Id. § 22.1-254.1(C).
211. Id. § 22.1-254.
212. Id. § 22.1-254(B)(1). Templates for such statements are readily available online.
See, e.g., Religious Exemption Sample Letter, AN OLD-FASHIONED EDUC., https://
www.oldfashionededucation.com/religiousexemptionletter.htm [https://perma.cc/2H99-EKF8].
213. § 22.1-254; see also CHRISTINE TSCHIDERER ET AL., 7,000 CHILDREN AND COUNTING: AN
ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS FROM COMPULSORY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE IN VIRGINIA
13–14 (2012).
214. IOWA CODE § 299.24 (2020) (exempting members of religious groups from educational
standards but permitting director and school board to condition renewal of exemption on proof of
achievement in “basic skills” including arithmetic, reading, writing, grammar, spelling, and history and
government); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-3120(g) (2020) (providing for religious exemption from
compulsory attendance requirements but requiring minimum hours of “learning activities” and
recordkeeping); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-27-1.1 (2020) (allowing religious exemption after eighth
grade, so long as “child participates in learning activities appropriate to the adult occupation that the
child is likely to assume in later years”).
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fundamental right to homeschool under the U.S. Constitution and that states
thus have broad authority to regulate—and arguably, prohibit—the practice. 215
Part II also showed, however, that when pressured by aggressive lobbying
efforts, state legislatures have abandoned all meaningful effort to supervise the
educations of children kept away from schools by their parents.
Some lawmakers may, like many homeschoolers, genuinely believe that
parents should have power, unfettered by state oversight, to control all aspects
of their children’s education. But there is evidence that many legislators instead
seem to have determined that devoting political, financial, and human capital
to the task of overseeing the education of children whose parents vehemently
resist any oversight is an unwise use of (already stretched) public resources. 216
While the calculus that has resulted in the current state of legislative affairs may
be understandable as a matter of politics for any given legislator (recall the
experience of New Jersey legislators), it is hardly defensible as a matter of
legislative principle. Stated differently, the current regulatory regime is the
result of political expedience and obeying one’s constituents rather than
engaging in considered, principled lawmaking aimed at advancing the
public’s—which of course includes children’s—welfare.
This part argues that it is past time to consider the principles that ought
to drive regulatory decisionmaking affecting homeschooling. It moves from the
descriptive to confront the normative question: what should be the state’s role
with respect to children whose parents wish to educate them entirely within the
home?
To address this question, we must first consider prior, broader normative
questions: What are the state’s goals with respect to the education of its
citizenry? And what role should the state play in bringing those goals about?
These are central questions in the political theory of education. The
following section approaches this question by identifying three of the most
significant of the state’s commitments: safeguarding its citizenry’s welfare and
liberty interests, ensuring that its citizenry will have the capacity to engage in
the self-governance that is the core of democratic government, and providing a
future workforce to occupy and power the private and public institutions that
are necessary in a flourishing civil society. The section that follows it addresses
implications for reforming the law of homeschooling so that it advances the
state’s core commitments.

215. See supra Section II.A; see also DRIVER, supra note 164, at 400; DWYER & PETERS, supra note
20, at 59.
216. See supra notes 185–214 and accompanying text.
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The Liberal State

Ours is a liberal state, used here not in the partisan-political sense of the
term “liberal,” but in the theoretical sense. Political theorist William Galston
argues that “[l]iberalism requires a robust though rebuttable presumption in
favor of individuals and groups leading their lives as they see fit, within a broad
range of legitimate variation, in accordance with their own understanding of
what gives life meaning and value.” 217
For purposes of this inquiry, I adopt the “standard liberal view” that
liberalism prioritizes both autonomy (or self-determination) and the legitimate
diversity of commitments. 218 Autonomy might be summarized as the ability to
chart the course of one’s own life and to choose and pursue one’s own
conception of the good. 219 Political theorist Rob Reich posits that autonomy
“has a civic justification in that the respect for and the exercise of autonomy are
connected to an understanding of freedom in a liberal society and are necessary
to establish the legitimacy of principles of justice and their stability over
generations.” 220
Diversity can result from individuals exercising autonomy and making
different choices about their values, beliefs, et cetera. Additionally, while the
United States is a single political community (or state), it (like most countries
of the world) comprises a multitude of diverse cultural communities. 221 People
of various nations and ethnicities, including voluntary immigrants and those
incorporated by conquest, agreement, or slavery, such as American Indians and
African Americans, constitute its citizenry. 222
Diversity itself is generally to the good, as multicultural exposure “mak[es]
vivid to the student a diversity of cultural practices and values, which
themselves may come to represent real and meaningful options that the student
could choose and seek to adopt or pursue.”223 In this way, diversity contributes
to autonomy; only through exposure to alternative beliefs, conceptions of the
good life, et cetera, can individuals make meaningful choices of their own.
217. WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE PLURALISM
FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 3 (2004).
218. Id. at 21.
219. ROB REICH, BRIDGING LIBERALISM AND MULTICULTURALISM IN AMERICAN
EDUCATION 93 (2002).
220. Id. at 152.
221. WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY
RIGHTS 11 (1996).
222. Id.
223. REICH, supra note 219, at 132. The desired diversity in U.S. education is both multicultural
and multiracial—the Supreme Court considers integrating public schools a compelling state interest to
remedy past segregation, pursue diversity of ideas in higher education, and equalize educational
opportunities between white and non-white children. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720–23 (2007) (plurality opinion); id. at 791, 797–98 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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Liberalism’s commitments to autonomy and diversity ideally coexist, but
they can also come into tension. For example, not all individuals and groups
value individual autonomy; some may instead prize faith and obedience. If the
state presses autonomy, it may undermine these central aspects of that group’s
identity and some diversity will be lost.
The following sections identify the implications of the liberal state’s
foundational commitments for the provision of education to its citizenry.
1. Respecting Parents’ Liberty Interests
Surely most parents view their childrearing choices as important
expressions of their own deeply held beliefs. As discussed above, current law
validates parents’ desires to shape their children’s experiences by declaring a
parental right to direct the upbringing and education of children. 224
Some scholars have criticized the very concept of parental “rights,” but
they disagree as to appropriate alternative formulations of the relationship
between parents and children. Dwyer and Peters have convincingly argued that
to conceive of parental authority over children as a “right” or entitlement is
profoundly misguided. 225 While parents may ardently desire to direct their
children’s upbringing, they ought not be given an “entitlement” to do so. Such
an entitlement vests in parents control not only over their own but also over
other persons’ (their children’s) lives. Thus, parental “rights” transform the
(acceptable) liberal value of self-determination into the (unacceptable) practice
of “other-determination.” 226
Dwyer and Peters suggest that “[i]f parental authority over education is
important to children’s welfare, then we should say that children have a right to
their parents’ holding such authority.” 227 Political philosopher Eamonn Callan
articulates the tension differently. He argues that parents’ entitlement to
control their children’s lives would “make individual children no more than
instruments of their parents’ good [which] would be open to damning moral
objections.” 228 He argues, however, that the converse is equally objectionable.
Callan reasons:
[P]arallel objections must be decisive against any theory that interprets
the parent’s role in ways that make individual parents no more than
instruments of their children’s good. We should want a conception of
224. See supra Section II.A.
225. See DWYER & PETERS, supra note 20, at 134–40 (arguing against conception of parental
authority as a “right” to control because children are distinct persons and rights granting individuals
determinative power over another’s life are anathema to our society).
226. Id. at 136.
227. Id. at 137 (emphasis in original).
228. EAMONN CALLAN, CREATING CITIZENS: POLITICAL EDUCATION AND LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY 145 (1997).
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parents’ rights in education that will not license the oppression of
children. But we should also want a conception that will do justice to the
hopes that parents have and the sacrifices they make in rearing their
children. 229
In other words, even though a fiduciary model of parenting allows for
parental responsibilities to promote their children’s interests rather than
entitlement to direct their lives, this model too is incomplete. Such a model
fails to account for the more complex, reciprocal nature of the parent-child
relationship.
For our purposes, it is sufficient to reject parents’ entitlement to
determine their children’s lives but also to respect parental interests in raising
their children consistent with their deepest values and commitments. Children
have an interest in being cared for and nurtured during their dependency. The
state, as guardian of its citizenry, thus has an interest in ensuring that care is
provided. Parents are most likely to be deeply invested in the well-being of their
offspring. It is thus in the interest of all—parents, children, and the state—that
parents be given presumptive authority to determine their children’s education.
Placing presumptive authority over their children’s educations with
parents countenances what Galston terms “expressive liberty”—the freedom of
“individuals or groups to live their lives in ways that express their deepest
beliefs about what gives meaning and value to life.” 230 He conceives of
expressive liberty as constituting “the portion of negative liberty that bears
directly on questions of identity.” 231 By allowing individuals’ lived experiences
to reflect their inner convictions, expressive liberty permits the aligning of
“conviction and deed” and “protects the ability of individuals and groups to live
in ways that others would regard as unfree.” 232
Galston would not oppose states imposing basic requirements on parents
for their children’s educational attainments. But he urges states to otherwise
avoid imposing educational uniformity through broad mandates. 233 In the next
section, I argue for somewhat broader limits to parental “expressive liberty” as
it relates to children’s educations.
In light of the troubling aspect of parental authority as “otherdetermining,” limits on its exercise are appropriate to secure for children
themselves the ability to be self-determining. Thus, the better principled and
more robust justification for respecting parents’ childrearing and education
choices as an aspect of their liberty is that presumptively respecting those
choices serves the instrumental purpose of safeguarding children’s well-being.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id.
GALSTON, supra note 217, at 101.
Id. at 28 n.1.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 109.
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2. Children’s Welfare, Agency, and Eventual Right to Self-Determination
Children are distinct persons and deserve consideration as such—even
during the prolonged period where they remain dependent on others for their
care. As discussed above, the state rightly delegates to parents the presumptive
obligation to safeguard children’s well-being. Doing so places children with
those most likely to be deeply invested in their welfare.
Children do not transition abruptly from total dependency to complete
autonomy. Legal scholars Anne C. Dailey and Laura A. Rosenbury have argued
that the existing legal regime elides children’s interests in the here and now. 234
They explain that even during dependency, children have interests in
maintaining relationships, receiving education, and exercising the agency of
which they are capable. 235 They thus suggest that emphasizing children’s
“agency” rather than “autonomy” can more accurately reflect “that children
often have the capacity to make decisions for themselves at the same time that
they are dependent upon adults.” 236
Finally, children are also future adults and citizens. As Reich has argued,
the state has an obligation to ensure that they reach adulthood having at least
attained what he calls “minimal autonomy,” which he defines as “the minimal
degree of autonomy necessary to provide them with options other than that into
which they have been born; they must have an effective right of exit.” 237
Political theorist Meira Levinson has developed a less minimal ideal of
autonomy as a “substantive notion of higher-order preference formation within
a context of cultural coherence, plural constitutive personal values and beliefs,
openness to others’ valuations of oneself, and a sufficiently developed moral,
spiritual or aesthetic, intellectual, and emotional personality.” 238 In order for
children to reliably develop the capacity to exercise autonomy, Levinson argues
that formal, state-regulated schooling is indispensable. 239
Galston agrees with Reich in that he would empower the state to set basic
standards of educational attainment. Galston is troubled, however, by the
notion that the state ought to promote autonomy for all citizens. 240 In doing so,
he argues that the state itself would be taking (and enforcing) a position on what
234. Anne C. Dailey & Laura A. Rosenbury, The New Law of the Child, 127 YALE L.J. 1448, 1453–
54 (2018).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1453.
237. REICH, supra note 219, at 163.
238. MEIRA LEVINSON, THE DEMANDS OF LIBERAL EDUCATION 35 (1999).
239. Id. at 36.
240. GALSTON, supra note 217, at 106–07. Galston posits as an example the Old Order Amish,
whose educational commitments discourage active participation in civic and political life as well as
critical reasoning. He acknowledges that “[t]hey may not be the best of citizens, but may we not say
that they are good enough? At least they fulfill the political version of the Hippocratic oath—to do no
harm.” Id. at 107.
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constitutes a good life, rather than simply creating conditions that allow its
citizenry to reach their own determinations about what constitutes the good
life. 241 Galston argues that the state would thus be constricting the liberty of its
citizenry. 242 Moreover, by rejecting systems of belief that embrace faith and
obedience, the state—rather than respecting diversity—suppresses it in favor of
universalized autonomy. 243 In other words, the value of autonomy in a plural
society itself must be contested.
Other political theorists have argued for more robust conceptions of
autonomy. 244 Stephen Macedo is among them, and he emphasizes the
importance of exposing children to belief systems other than those of their
parents:
What is crucial from a liberal standpoint is that no one educational
authority should totally dominate: that children acquire a measure of
distance on all claims to truth in order to be able to think critically about
our inclusive political ideals and detect conflicts between those inclusive
ideals and their more particular moral and religious convictions. 245
Macedo suggests that parents themselves need not embrace liberal ideals,
but that exposure to multiple viewpoints is essential. “The point is not,” he
writes, “to promote a comprehensive philosophical doctrine of autonomy or
individuality, but to make sure that no authority imposes an intellectual tyranny
on children, which would thwart their right to freedom.” 246
Along similar lines is the somewhat broader concept of children’s “right to
an open future.” 247 Coined by legal and political philosopher Joel Feinberg in
1980, the right to an open future encompasses a set of moral rights that protects
children from having important life choices determined by others before the
child has the ability to make the choices for themselves. The right to an open
future therefore restricts what parents may do to their children, but also imposes
obligations on what parents ought to provide them.

241. Id. at 107.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., Christian F. Rostbøll, Kantian Autonomy and Political Liberalism, 37 SOC. THEORY &
PRAC. 341, 341 (2011) (questioning the concept that “one can draw a wedge between respect for persons
and autonomy”).
245. STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A
MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 238 (2003).
246. Id.
247. Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD?: CHILDREN’S RIGHTS,
PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980); see
also MICHAEL A. REBELL, FLUNKING DEMOCRACY 86–90 (2018) (surveying a range of political
scientists who argue the importance of providing students sufficient exposure to information and ideas
to enable them to make their own decisions about their future lives).
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At the very least, then, the liberal state has an obligation during children’s
dependency to ensure their welfare, taking account of and safeguarding their
distinct personhood and agency. 248 In addition, Macedo and Reich persuasively
argue that the state also has an obligation to ensure they are educated such that
they are able to, as adults, exercise meaningful choices about the course of their
lives (“minimal autonomy,” to use Reich’s formulation).
Conversely, while Galston’s warning that the state risks overstepping by
promoting the value of universal autonomy is well taken, the alternative is for
the state to enable only some parents to determine the life course of their
children—an outcome fundamentally at odds with the core commitments of a
liberal state.
B.

The Democratic State: Cultivating a Citizenry Capable of Self-Government

As noted above, the diverse individuals and groups in the United States
together form a single political democratic community. In order to function,
democracies require some level of public participation in governance. At its
most basic level, a democracy requires elected officials qualified to govern and
an informed public who will elect them.
In 1842, a Pennsylvania superintendent declared the centrality of
education to the preservation of democratic institutions: “The foundations of
our political institutions rest upon man’s capacity for self-government; not the
capacity of one, of a hundred, of a thousand, but of all . . . . Enlightened public
opinion will be a wall of fire around our free institutions, and preserve them
inviolate forever.” 249
To be sure, the above statement articulates an idealistic vision of universal
capacity and participation to which democratic states may realistically only
aspire. Even citizens capable of political participation, for example, routinely
decline to participate, or face barriers or outright prohibitions to participation.
While not all of a democracy’s members need to choose to participate,
those who do not must accept the results reached by those who have
participated. By opting out of participating, they have chosen to accept the
governance decisions of others. The “better” democracies are those with high

248. To reiterate, individualism and liberalism are not central values in all states or cultures. More
collectivist cultures prioritize the group over the individual, a commitment captured by the well-known
Russian proverb that “the tallest blade of grass will be the first to be cut.” Manfred F.R. Kets de Vries,
The Anarchist Within: Clinical Reflections on Russian Character and Leadership Style, 54 HUM. REL. 585,
599–600 (2001) (discussing the traditional “Russian character” as including an “orientation that
subordinates individual interests to those of the group” and observing “the degree to which
individualism and personal achievement as known in other societies are frowned upon in Russia . . .
[and instead] associated with selfishness”).
249. CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN
SOCIETY, 1780-1860 97 (1983).
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levels of participation, which results in a truer reflection of the collective will
of the governed.
For political philosopher Amy Gutmann, the democratic ideal is a
deliberative democracy in which there is “reciprocity among free and equal
individuals [and c]itizens and their accountable representatives offer one
another morally defensible reasons for mutually binding laws in an ongoing
process of mutual justification.” 250 Education must prepare citizens both to
engage in deliberative decisionmaking and “to evaluate the results of the
deliberations of their representatives.” 251 The deliberation required of
competent citizens is not a single skill, but instead comprises a set of skills and
virtues. Deliberation in democracy “calls upon skills of literacy, numeracy, and
critical thinking, as well as contextual knowledge, understanding, and
appreciation of other people’s perspectives.” 252 Gutmann argues that
deliberation also encompasses certain virtues, including “veracity, nonviolence,
practical judgment, civic integrity and magnanimity.” 253
A multicultural liberal education “plays an instrumental role in cultivation
of minimalist autonomy and certain political virtues, including mutual respect
and the capacity for public reason and democratic deliberation.” 254
C.

The Economic State: Raising a Modern Workforce

For Horace Mann and the other founders of publicly funded common
schools, the overarching goal of schools was to create citizens, not workers. 255
At the time, of course, the economy of vast swaths of the nation continued to
be based in agriculture. The industrial revolution was well under way, creating
a demand for large numbers of laborers. Farmers, factory laborers, and other
workers possessing relatively rudimentary levels of education could thus
perform much of the available work in the United States.
Today, the economic landscape has changed dramatically. Globalization
and technological advances have transformed the U.S. economy. Agricultural
and industrial production are increasingly mechanized. Service and technology
sectors require workers with higher degrees of education than in the past. A
secondary education today is typically a minimum requirement for employment
(at the lowest levels of earnings), but postsecondary education or vocational
skills have become increasingly necessary to obtain well-paying work.
The role of schools in educating for the workplace has thus
supplemented—if not supplanted—their role in educating for citizenship. As a
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION xii (rev. ed. 1999).
Id. at xiii.
Id.
Id.
REICH, supra note 219, at 152.
Id. at 5.
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result, the curricular requirements for a basic education—one that prepares
individuals to participate in the economic sphere—have increased. Basic
literacy, numeracy, and civics are no longer sufficient. 256
Today’s technological environment requires some level of computer
literacy, and the increasingly service-focused nature of work requires the ability
to communicate and work with individuals from a range of cultural and national
backgrounds. To be clear, not everyone will participate in the workplace; many,
including parents of young children, will choose not to do so. The state’s
obligation, however, is to ensure that those of its citizens who opt out of
workplace participation are exercising a meaningful choice, rather than taking
the only path open to them.
IV. BRIDGING HOME AND SCHOOL
The previous part argues that the state has, at a minimum, the following
commitments with respect to children:
(1) Ensure that children receive care and nurturing during their
dependency that respects their rights as distinct persons, even prior
to reaching maturity.
(2) Recognize that parents have an abiding interest in childrearing and
are likely to be the persons most invested in children’s well-being.
For that reason, the state should presumptively place children in
the care, and under the authority, of their parents.
(3) Ensure that children receive an upbringing and education that
enables them to be aware of the range of life choices and be
reasonably able to direct the course of lives.
(4) Ensure that children also receive an education pursuant to a
curriculum that prepares them to be competent democratic citizens
and workers.
How would these requirements shape state regulation of homeschooling?
As discussed above, parents choose to homeschool for various reasons.
Some parents seek to tailor curricula for their academically gifted, or perhaps
developmentally challenged, children. Some parents seek the flexibility that
homeschooling provides, enabling their children talented in athletics, music, or
other activities to spend significant time specializing their skills. 257 Some
parents may simply believe they can provide a better education for their
children than they might receive in regular schools.

256. See, e.g., Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 354, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (1997) (pronouncing
“sound basic education” as a minimum qualitative standard for constitutionally required primary and
secondary education in North Carolina).
257. See supra Section I.C.
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Evidence suggests that most parents, particularly those with
fundamentalist religious views, keep their children from schools because they
wish to imbue in their children their own religious beliefs and cultural values.
These parents tend to fear that exposure to certain information and values
antithetical to their beliefs will harm their children. 258 They believe that their
children might be confused by the exposure to views and values that contradict
those in which they have been raised—or enticed to accept different values. 259
For these parents, the risks posed by exposure are high—children who stray
may risk suffering eternal damnation. 260
Amy Gutmann has expressed concern, however, that “[t]o save their
children from future pain, especially the pain of eternal damnation, parents have
historically shielded their children from diverse associations, convinced them
that all other ways of life are sinful, and implicitly fostered (if not explicitly
taught them) disrespect for people who are different.” 261
The following sections address how homeschooling—particularly
religiously motivated homeschooling—advances, or fails to advance, the state’s
interests in developing self-determining citizens capable of meaningful
participation in both democratic government and economic life.
A.

Homeschooling and Autonomy

Many parents deny their children the educational experiences required to
exercise the minimal autonomy due individuals in the liberal democratic state.
Without meaningful exposure to a variety of ideas, values, and life alternatives,
children are deprived of meaningful life choices—they will lack knowledge of
alternatives available to them, as well as the ability to avail themselves of various
alternatives.
Reich argues against the inadequacy of monolithic educational approaches,
reasoning that cultivating minimal “autonomy requires a multicultural
education that exposes children to and engages them with cultural values and
beliefs other than those of their parents.” 262 This type of education can occur,
Reich notes, either through curricular content (readers, other educational
258. See id. A specific example comes from Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827
F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), where the Sixth Circuit reject[ed] Christian parents’ request to exempt their
children—students at public school—from having to read textbooks that exposed them to various
philosophies and religious backgrounds. Id. at 1065. The Sixth Circuit found that the books were
neutral on the subject of religion and held that a “requirement that students read the assigned materials
. . . in the absence of a showing that this participation entailed affirmation or denial of a religious belief
. . . does not place an unconstitutional burden on the students’ free exercise of religion.” Id.
Subsequently, the parents withdrew their children from the school altogether. Id.
259. See Ross, supra note 20, at 996.
260. Id. at 998.
261. GUTMANN, supra note 250, at 31.
262. REICH, supra note 219, at 161.
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methods in which children learn about history, cultures, religions, et cetera) or
by being educated with children who themselves identify with various
multicultural groups. 263 The latter, immersive approach seems more likely to be
effective. It is also surely more difficult to engineer given the highly segregated
nature of communities today.
It is possible for states to mandate that homeschooling parents provide
curricular content aimed at exposing children to a variety of values and cultures.
It is not likely, however, that such a mandate would succeed. Indeed, such a
regulation would likely run afoul of constitutional restrictions on compelled
speech.
B.

Homeschooling and Democratic Citizenship

The state should prepare its citizens for democratic participation, which
includes the capacity to participate in public discourse (which involves some
level of engagement with fellow citizens, some of whom have different cultural,
racial, and other identities) and deliberation. 264
The parents of many homeschooled children, however, seek to keep their
children out of schools for the purpose of avoiding exposure to different cultures
and ideas. By depriving their children of experiences with people of different
cultures, races, and ethnicities, they increase the likelihood that their adult
children will be unable to appreciate the shared humanity of their fellow
citizens, unlikely to embrace the mutual respect needed for peaceful coexistence,
and incapable of engaging in productive political (or other) dialogue.
C.

Homeschooling for the Modern Workforce

The state should ensure its citizens will have the capacity to choose to
participate in the modern workforce. As noted above, some families believe in
providing meaningful academic experience only for their male children,
depriving girls of education and potentially rendering them unable to choose to
engage in work they might find meaningful. 265 Many homeschooling families
do not teach children accepted science, or scientific methods, instead teaching
the Bible as literal “scientific” truth. 266

263. Id. at 131.
264. GUTMANN, supra note 250, at xiii.
265. See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text.
266. Then-President of Stanford University Donald Kennedy reviewed textbooks sold by
Christian publishers and used by homeschooling families in a lawsuit challenging the state university
system’s rejection of courses using these texts as sufficient preparation for entrance. Ass’n of Christian
Sch. Int’l v. Stearns, 679 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1114 (C.D. Cal. 2008), aff’d, 362 F. App’x 640 (9th Cir.
2010). Kennedy concluded that the books taught students “to reject scientific evidence and
methodology whenever they might be inconsistent with the Bible” and failed to “encourage critical
thinking and the skills required for careful scientific analysis.” Id.
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Some parents lack the academic capacity to provide their children with the
equivalent of a secondary education. More than thirty percent of homeschooling
parents have at most a high school degree or its equivalent; fifteen percent of
those have not completed high school. 267
In theory, the availability of online programs and other commercially
available materials for homeschoolers can help committed parents ensure their
children receive meaningful academic instruction, even if the parents
themselves are unable to provide it. As discussed above, however, the absence
of data leaves states ignorant of the quality of academic instruction that the
overwhelming number of homeschoolers receive.
Evidence (or lack of evidence) respecting academic attainment,
particularly at the secondary level, is cause for concern. Certainly, early
childhood is an important period of experience-dependent neurological
development. As I discuss below, however, the sorts of experiences that enrich
young children’s intellectual development are well within the abilities of typical
parents.
Early adolescence, however, “also provides educational and social
experiences that are critical for developmental outcomes.” 268 And during the
early teen years, neurological changes result in the strengthening of neuronal
connections activated by the activities in which young teens engage—hence the
importance of intellectual experiences and engagement. 269 This developmental
period largely ends by late adolescence or early adulthood. It is possible, then,
that delaying or failing to provide experiences may result in adolescents’ failing
to develop their full cognitive potential. 270
Moreover, researchers have discovered that supporting adolescents’
continued cognitive development requires encouraging their disposition to
engage in, and thus develop competencies in, desired activities. In other words,
“the valuing of intellectual engagement is a critical dimension to be supported
by people who work with young adolescents.” 271 It likely goes without saying,
however, that parents who do not value intellectual engagement or critical
thinking are unlikely to support their adolescent children’s disposition to
develop these capacities.
267. See Homeschool Demographics, COAL. FOR RESPONSIBLE HOME EDUC.,
https://www.responsiblehomeschooling.org/homeschooling-101/homeschool-demographics/ [https://
perma.cc/Q39E-M8W9].
268. Leon Feinstein & John Bynner, The Importance of Cognitive Development in Middle Childhood
for Adulthood Socioeconomic Status, Mental Health, and Problem Behavior, 75 CHILD DEV. 1329, 1329
(2004).
269. See Beatriz Luna et al., Maturation of Cognitive Processes from Late Childhood to Adulthood, 75
CHILD DEV. 1357, 1357–58 (2004).
270. See Hamilton, Immature Citizens, supra note 2, at 1130.
271. Deanna Kuhn, Do Cognitive Changes Accompany Developments in the Adolescent Brain?, 1 PERSP.
ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 59, 65 (2006).
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D. Existing Proposals
Some scholars have suggested that homeschooling be altogether
foreclosed. Meira Levinson, for example, argues that the ideal of personal
autonomy “not merely permits but requires the intrusion of the state into the
child’s life, specifically in the form of compulsory liberal schooling.” 272 For
education to reliably facilitate children’s eventual development of autonomy, it
must take place in an environment other than the home. 273 Levinson concludes
that it is difficult for children to achieve autonomy “solely within the bounds of
their families and home communities—or even within the bounds of schools
whose norms are constituted by those held by the child’s home community.” 274
Elizabeth Bartholet argues that the existing homeschooling regime raises
both academic and democratic concerns. The isolation of many homeschooling
families, moreover, exposes children to risk of maltreatment in families isolated
from broader society and school personnel required to report suspected child
maltreatment. 275 Bartholet proposes a regime that would “deny the right to
homeschool, subject to carefully delineated exceptions in which homeschooling
is needed and appropriate.” Parents would shoulder a “significant” burden to
justify an exception. Examples of situations that might merit exceptions would
include children whose artistic or athletic talents required flexibility
inconsistent with normal schooling, children with disabilities, or seriously
inadequate local schools. 276 Even in those cases where families receive
exceptions, Bartholet would require children to attend some courses and
programming at school, such as civic education and physical education. 277
Dwyer and Peters argue that states instead should bear the burden of
justifying compulsory regular-school attendance. 278 They argue for the primacy
of children’s, rather than parents’, rights. And children, they argue, have a “right
presumptively to stay at home.” 279 Thus, in order to force them to leave for
schooling, “the state would need to show that compulsory schooling outside the
home is necessary to secure certain important goods for a child.” 280 Dwyer and
Peters reason that homeschools can provide adequate education to children, and
that this education can in some cases be superior to regular schooling. They
acknowledge, however, that the lack of oversight and data currently deprives
states of the ability to determine whether homeschooling is even minimally

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

LEVINSON, supra note 238, at 58.
Id.
Id.; see also Bartholet, supra note 15, at 57; Fineman & Shepherd, supra note 20, at 60.
See Bartholet, supra note 15, at 4.
Id. at 72–73.
Id.
DWYER & PETERS, supra note 20, at 195.
Id. at 195.
Id. at 197.
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adequate. 281 Thus, to ensure academic achievement and child well-being, they
would have states implement significantly more robust regulatory regimes that
would include “a meaningful initial qualification process, subsequent periodic
review, and remedial action when homeschooling proves deficient.” 282
Dwyer and Peters join other scholars and organizations that have proposed
that homeschooling be permitted, but that states increase their oversight. 283
They have proposed, for example, that children be required to take regular
standardized tests, taught a broad range of subjects, et cetera. 284
Indeed, the American Law Institute’s draft Restatement of Children and
the Law, which aims to both “restate” a body of law but also identify themes
and emerging reform trends, embraces this approach. 285 The reporters note that
“the approach of the small minority of states that authorize homeschooling
subject to substantial regulation” can promote child well-being, because parents
can be in the best position to determine the educational needs of their particular
child. 286
Dailey and Rosenbury have suggested that homeschooling be tolerated in
the primary years, but prohibited in the secondary years, “to ensure that
children are afforded a meaningful educational experience, one that fosters
children’s present well-being as well as their development over time.” 287

281. Id. at 203–04.
282. Id. at 206; see also MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT,
AND AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS 136–37 (2010) (arguing that if homeschooling parents fail to
provide their children “adequate opportunity to develop liberal democratic dispositions,” then the state
ought to impose minimal intervention, such as requiring attendance at afterschool programs; Eichner
supports prohibiting homeschooling altogether only if the less intrusive interventions fail).
283. See, e.g., DWYER & PETERS, supra note 20, at 226; Ross, supra note 20, at 992. The Coalition
for Responsible Home Education, an organization formed by critical homeschool graduates, developed
reform recommendations aimed at preventing child maltreatment and ensuring adequate academic
content. See Policy Recommendations, COAL. FOR RESPONSIBLE HOME EDUC. (Jan. 15, 2014), http://
www.responsiblehomeschooling.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Policy-Recommendations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JTJ7-2MY6].
284. See, e.g., Robin L. West, The Harms of Homeschooling, 29 PHIL. & PUB. POL’Y Q., Summer/Fall
2009, at 7, 9–12. Gutmann too suggests that homeschooling, within certain acceptable liberal bounds
(and thus presumably subject to state oversight), could be consistent with democratic citizenship.
GUTMANN, supra note 250, at xiv. She observes that “citizens could legitimately cede more
comprehensive educational authority to parents, as long as parents did not thereby infringe upon the
basic liberty or opportunity of their children as future free and equal citizens or upon anybody else’s
basic liberties or opportunities.” Id.
285. See Clare Huntington & Elizabeth S. Scott, Conceptualizing Legal Childhood in the Twenty-First
Century, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1371, 1378–79 (discussing the promotion of child well-being as a framework
that the new ALI restatement will embrace for homeschooling regulations).
286. Id. at 47–48 (discussing the promotion of child well-being as a framework unifying laws
involving children and situating homeschooling regulations within that framework).
287. Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 234, at 1521. They would allow for exemptions in special
cases, such as gifted athletes or children with special education requirements. Id. at 1522–23.
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A Proposal for Both Compromise and Principle

I propose an approach that presumptively allows parents the ability to
educate younger children at home with minimal state oversight. Once children
reach adolescence and the secondary grades, however, the educational,
democratic, and developmental considerations require that the presumption be
flipped. Thus, parents will bear the burden of overcoming a presumption against
homeschooling and in favor of regular school, be it public or private, for their
child’s secondary education. The following sections provide further justification
for this bifurcated approach.
1. Presumptively Permitting Homeschooling in the Primary Years
Allowing parents to homeschool young children through the primary years
is consistent with state educational aims. Research demonstrates that
experiences during the early childhood years can be critical to long-term
development. Early experiences that offer intellectual stimulation can enhance
neurological development and increase academic success. 288 At the same time,
the sorts of experiences likely to benefit early development comprise activities
well within the abilities of the typical parent—talking and reading to children,
counting, singing, et cetera. Whereas states might undertake efforts to educate
parents about the importance of early childhood learning (perhaps by widely
disseminating and promoting educational materials), no advanced education or
special skills are required. Instead, the vast majority of parents have the capacity
to provide appropriate learning environments in children’s early years without
possessing advanced qualifications or even a commitment to their children’s
eventual development of autonomy, civic participation, et cetera.
Noninterference during this period can allow parents to share their values
and conception of what the “good life” means with children during their
formative years. 289 In granting parents presumptive authority over childrearing
and education, the state countenances parents’ liberty interests in raising their
children, acknowledges the extent to which parents invest in childrearing as
central to their own life meaning, and also respects diversity.
Notwithstanding presumptive deference to parental authority, the state
must both safeguard its obligation to children’s welfare and later autonomy and
withhold from parents absolute authority over their children. Parents should
not be permitted to interfere with their children in such a way as to conclusively
decide the course of their lives—a fact recognized in existing laws limiting
parental authority in ways such as preventing the withholding of medical
treatment from a critically ill child.
288. See LAWRENCE J. SCHWEINHART, THE HIGH/SCOPE PERRY PRESCHOOL
THROUGH AGE 40: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1, 5
289. See Hamilton, Immature Citizens, supra note 2, at 1061.
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The state should also require parents to provide an education appropriate
to children’s age and grade levels, sufficient to prepare them for secondary
education. At the elementary levels, parents may decide the great majority of
the content of their children’s educations. The state should ensure, however,
that children achieve literacy and numeracy skills consistent with their gradelevel peers. Thus, homeschooled children should submit to regular standardized
testing administered and supervised by school (or school-designated) officials.
Regular testing may serve another important state goal: ensuring the
welfare of homeschooled children. Administering tests would provide officials
an opportunity to assess the apparent health of children—including whether
their height and weight appear consistent with adequate nourishment and
whether they are clean and adequately clothed. Given that many cases of
maltreatment involve severe abuse and neglect, semi-annual testing and
observation may be an effective instrument to monitor academic attainment and
physical well-being. Even annual official observation may help identify and
address issues.
Professor Bartholet proposes that, in the exceptional cases where
homeschooling should be permitted, states should still require that children
regularly attend at least some courses and programs at school. 290 Bartholet
reasons that such a requirement ensures regular oversight by mandatory
reporters and can thus safeguard children’s well-being. 291 While more frequent
contact with school officials may very well be preferable, my proposal stops
short of required school attendance for pragmatic reasons: First, parents will
surely resist more frequent oversight and testing as overly intrusive. Second,
education officials may also object to partial attendance requirements as
administratively burdensome and costly.
2. Presumption Against Home Secondary-Schooling
To better ensure that the state meets its obligations to its school-aged
citizenry, I propose a return (of sorts) to the pre-1980s status quo. Such a return
would contemplate that all children would presumptively attend some regular
school, be it public or private, that is subject to state oversight and regulation. 292
Instead of what has today become a presumption in favor of unregulated
homeschooling, states would reimpose a presumption against homeschooling in
the secondary grades. Families wishing to homeschool would bear the burden
of making the case to designated state officials that they would provide their
290. Bartholet, supra note 15, at 73.
291. Id. at 76.
292. To be clear, compulsory attendance is distinct from state monopoly on the provision of
education. John Stuart Mill, for example, opposed a state-dominated system of education as a “mere
contrivance for molding people to be exactly like one another.” JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 158
(Michael B. Mathias ed., 2007).
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children an education that satisfies state criteria with respect to children’s
welfare and future autonomy interests, citizenship, and workplace and
postsecondary education preparation.
Importantly, parents’ own religious convictions would not be sufficient to
merit an exemption from compulsory attendance of their children. Permitting
otherwise unqualified parents to direct their children’s educations as an aspect
of the parents’ own exercise of religion treats children as instruments of their
parents’ wills and contravenes the state’s commitment to self-determination and
against other-determination.
Homeschool advocates may, as discussed above, argue that their
adolescent children will be confused and potentially traumatized by exposure to
information and beliefs that contradict the values their parents have sought to
impart. Such concerns about the psychological harms threatened by exposure to
different cultures and values may be sincerely held, but they are unfounded.
Instead, by the time they reach high school age, children’s cognitive ability to
comprehend and manage dissonance between their home education and
externally provided education are substantially the same as that of their
parents. 293 They are no more likely to be confused by such exposure than adults
might be, whereas younger children might well be confused. Indeed, “[m]any
adults cease to show any development beyond levels achieved by typical early
adolescents.” 294
For those parents who overcome the presumption against home secondary
schooling, state oversight—including regular standardized testing—should
continue. States should, moreover, not just tolerate but encourage partial
attendance at regular school, including participation in extracurricular activities,
to the extent that accommodating such participation does not become
administratively burdensome. Even partial participation helps achieve state
goals for all its students, including those who are otherwise homeschooled.
Ensuring that homeschooled adolescents experience meaningful peer
interaction is consistent with research that the social world and peer interactions
within it become increasingly important during this developmental stage.
Developmental psychologists have found that peer orientation—rather than
being a primarily negative influence—facilitates adolescents’ “development into
independent adults, [and] enable[s] them to foster a more complete sense of
social self-identity.” 295
293. See Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults?: Minors’ Access to
Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 583, 590–
92 (2009).
294. Kuhn, supra note 271, at 65.
295. Amy Orben, Livia Tomova & Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, The Effects of Social Deprivation on
Adolescent Social Development and Mental Health, 4 LANCET CHILD ADOLESCENT HEALTH 634, 635
(2020), https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S2352-4642%2820%2930186-3 [https://
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Anticipated Objections

In a recent essay, Martin Guggenheim characterized a proposal to prohibit
homeschooling as “radical” and suggested that no state has ever imposed a
requirement that children attend regular school. 296 That a respected children’s
law scholar considers such a prohibition to be radical demonstrates the
wholesale transformation of the education landscape as well as public acceptance
of homeschooling as a new normal.
Recall, however, that in striking down Nebraska’s requirement that all
children attend not only regular school, but public schools exclusively, the
Supreme Court explained that its holding left intact broad state authority over
education, including compulsory attendance, noting that “[t]he power of the State
to compel attendance at some school and to make reasonable regulations for all
schools . . . is not questioned.” 297 And as recently as the 1980s, homeschooling was
prohibited in many states, and parents who flouted compulsory attendance laws
were prosecuted. 298
A return to the pre-1980s state of affairs would require legislative fortitude
on the part of state lawmakers. Thus far, the homeschool lobby has proven
successful by launching uniquely aggressive targeted campaigns. 299 It will not
be easy for legislators to defy this special interest group—particularly when the
constituents whose interests legislators seek to protect are not yet of voting age.
Homeschooling parents, of course, will object to having to shoulder the
burden of overcoming the presumption. For those who can and intend to
provide adequate educations, the imposition will be a relatively minor
inconvenience. For others, namely those parents who wish to homeschool for
the express purpose of shielding their adolescents from external sources of
information or different beliefs, burden shifting will operate as an effective
prohibition on the homeschooling of their high school-aged children.
CONCLUSION
The state’s interests in education of its citizenry include ensuring that
children are cared for, able to live self-determined lives, and able to develop
into a citizenry that is capable of self-government and workforce participation.
These commitments require states to examine whether the unregulated practice
perma.cc/6CVC-XBSB]; see also Jennifer H. Pfeifer & Elliot T. Berkman, The Development of Self and
Identity in Adolescence: Neural Evidence and Implications for a Value-Based Choice Perspective on Motivated
Behavior, 12 CHILD DEV. PERSP. 158, 162 (2018) (“[S]ocial perceptions provide information about the
self and help shape adolescents’ personal values and identity . . .”).
296. Martin Guggenheim, The (Not So) New Law of the Child, 127 YALE L.J.F. 942, 950–51 (2018).
297. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (emphasis added).
298. See Yuracko, supra note 20, at 124; see also DWYER & PETERS, supra note 20, at 64–65
(discussing the prosecution of homeschooling parents in Texas in the 1980s).
299. See supra Section II.B.
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of homeschooling is consistent with those commitments. I have argued that it
is not. The regulatory approach I propose here, rather than being radical, is
instead both principled and pragmatic, accommodating the interests of parents,
children, and the state.

